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Abstract   This chapter provides a detailed overview of contemporary socio-
material and practice-based approaches, focusing in particular on their implica-
tions for conceiving workplace learning. It lays the theoretical foundations for the 
analysis and arguments developed in Parts II and III. It sets out an ontological po-
sition, and key concepts that are not so much applied in the subsequent empirical 
work, but tangled up in it (including in the approach to ethnographic fieldwork. 
These foundations are set in a broader context, namely sociomaterial approaches. 
The way in which contemporary theorists are ‘rethinking the thing’ is highlighted, 
based on performative, diffractive and non-representational ontologies. The ‘prac-
tice turn’ is located within these wider, diverse, traditions, and Schatzki’s practice 
theory is presented as an overarching framework for this book. Next, research on 
workplace learning is considered, highlighting the metaphor of emergence and its 
links to concepts of knowledge. Here Gherardi and others’ practice-based studies 
are significant, emphasising knowing in practice and aesthetics. The chapter then 
shifts gear introducing the key arguments that are developed in the remainder of 
the book. Times, spaces, bodies and things are introduced as four essential dimen-
sions of professional practice and learning, and then a distinctive view of profes-
sional learning in an asymmetrical and non-reversible relationship with practice is 
presented. Learning and practice are viewed as entangled, but analytically distin-
guishable, and criteria for specifying this distinction are presented.  
Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed overview of contemporary sociomaterial and 
practice-based approaches, focusing in particular on their implications for con-
ceiving workplace learning. It chapter lays the theoretical foundations for the anal-
ysis and arguments developed in Parts II and III. It sets out my ontological posi-
tion, and key concepts that are not so much applied in the subsequent empirical 
work, but tangled up in it (including in the approach to ethnographic fieldwork, 
see Chapter 4). I begin by setting these foundations in a broader context, namely 
sociomaterial approaches. Here I highlight the way in which contemporary theo-
rists are ‘rethinking the thing’, based on performative, diffractive and non-repre-
sentational ontologies. I then locate the ‘practice turn’ within these wider, diverse, 
traditions, and hone in on Schatzki’s practice theory, as an overarching framework 
for this book. Next, I turn to research on workplace learning, highlighting the met-
aphor of emergence and its links to concepts of knowledge. Here I draw on Gher-
ardi and others’ practice-based studies approach, which emphasises knowing in 
practice and aesthetics. The chapter then shifts gear and constructs a bridge to 
Parts II and III by outlining, in more abstract and general form, the key arguments 
2  
that are developed in the remainder of the book. I introduce times, spaces, bodies 
and things as four essential dimensions of professional practice and learning, and 
then outline my view of professional learning in an asymmetrical and non-reversi-
ble relationship with practice. Learning and practice are viewed as entangled, but 
analytically distinguishable, and my criteria for specifying this distinction are pre-
sented. I conclude by explaining Vygotskian ideas of the zone of proximal devel-
opment (ZPD) and scaffolding: these form a basis for conceptualising the peda-
gogic dimension of professional work in partnership with service users.  
 
Before delving into the world of theory itself, I wish to clarify something at a 
meta-level about my approach to working with theory. The work of this book is 
deeply entangled with the ideas of Schatzki, Gherardi, and others. I make less sys-
tematic and detailed contact with the ontological work of Barad and Thrift, and 
connect purposefully but eclectically with a wide range of theorists in order to ex-
pand on the dimensions of times, spaces, bodies and things. There, the framing 
draws on Lefebvre, Massey, Grosz, Shove, and others, making more than glancing 
contact with critical cultural geographies, and relevant lines of feminist scholar-
ship. What is going on here? I imagine alarm bells are already ringing for some 
readers, perhaps seeking something neater or simpler, perhaps concerned about a 
lack of coherence or consistency between ideas that have very different discipli-
nary and, at times, philosophical origins and political agendas. 
 
Such concerns are well placed, and my aim here is to justify my approach. Firstly, 
let me address the question of deeper theoretical coherence. To me the value of 
theory is only ever tangible when it becomes entangled1 with data, with the empir-
ical. I thus see less value in questioning the compatibility or otherwise of one the-
ory with ones in abstract terms, than in seeing what can be produced when these 
are brought into different relationships with data. The question is not, for example: 
‘Is it theoretically coherent to draw on both Schatzki and Gherardi?’. Instead it is, 
‘What benefit is gained by drawing on both bodies of work, with respect to partic-
ular questions and research agendas, and in the process of their being worked 
through empirical data?’. The questions and agendas that provide the referent for 
this book are those outlined in Chapter 1: exploring what shifts towards partner-
ship and coproduction mean for our understanding of professional practice and 
learning; producing accounts of these phenomena that let go of Cartesian dual-
isms, and rational, cognitivist ideologies, instead foregrounding bodies and materi-
ality as inherently wound up with knowing performances that uphold practices. 
That said, there must be limits to playfulness and eclecticism. For these reasons I 
take care to outline the bases upon which I see a sufficient complementarity be-
tween my (site) ontological position, and the various theories and concepts I bring 
into play.  
 
Such an approach to working with theory is not particularly unusual. Nicolini 
(2009b) presents the idea of ‘zooming in and out’, trailing different connections in 
                                                          
1 I am borrowing on Baradian ideas and vocabulary here, appropriating them significantly. 
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practices by moving between different theoretical lenses. Each enables us to take a 
different position, foregrounding aspects of practice while bracketing others. He 
writes: 
A coherent practice approach needs also to address how translocal phenomena come into 
being and persist in time as effects of the mutual relationships between the local real-time 
accomplishments of practices, as well as how they make a difference in the local process 
of organizing. For theorizing practice, we need an appropriate methodological approach 
that makes us see the connection between the here-and-now of the situated practising and 
the elsewhere-and-then of other practices. I will describe this second movement as 
‘zooming out of’ practice. Theorizing practice thus requires a double movement of 
zooming in on and zooming out of practice obtained by switching theoretical lenses and 
following, or trailing, the connections between practices. (Nicolini 2009b, p 1392). 
In this book, zooming in and out does not quite follow the same scalar principles; 
it has a lateral component, too. I see a similar lateral approach in Nicolini’s (2012) 
exploration of telemedicine through a ‘rolling case study’, in which he draws on 
Giddens and Bourdieu, CHAT, ethnomethodology, Heideggarian and Wittgen-
steinian practice theory, and discourse analysis. Each has a different resolution, 
yes, but their differences are more than scalar. As I explain in reference to the four 
essential dimensions of times, spaces, bodies, things, holding each at the forefront 
of our gaze enables us to attend to features of practices and learning that might 
otherwise be overlooked. Taking them up as different analytical points of depar-
ture helps make connections to theoretical ideas that enrich the analysis, the entan-
glement between questions, data and concepts.  
 
Such theoretical pluralism or multiplicity affords an open-mindedness in both 
thinking through data with different concepts, and thinking through concepts as 
they brush up against different data. Jackson and Mazzei (2011, 2013) suggest this 
increases possibilities for creating new knowledge about complex social phenom-
ena. By ‘plugging’ (I prefer the metaphor of entangling) data and theory together 
in multiple ways, they suggest we can avoid simplistic and mechanistic interpreta-
tion than could be achieved through a rigid thematic analysis and singular theoreti-
cal tool. In other words, this approach helps to guard against theoretical over-de-
terminism (see also Chapter 4), while enriching the analysis. 
 
We must then confront the question of when to stop, how many lenses to adopt. 
My response is to seek parsimony: the delicate balance between complexity and 
power in explanation. For example, does the value gained by folding in Lefebvre’s 
(2004) rhythmanalysis outweigh the additional conceptual burden this brings, and 
the potential tensions arising in terms of theoretical compatibility? In the case of 
the analysis presented here, my sense is unequivocally ‘yes’. In other cases, I have 
let go, particularly in relation to concepts of practice memory, affect, language, 
and power. Not because they are uninteresting or irrelevant, but because to venture 
down these avenues would require switching the gaze yet again, more zooming in 
and out, and the result would likely be a weaker response to the questions and is-
sues posed in Chapter 1.  
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My final step by means of introduction is to acknowledge the personal dimension 
in theoretical work. No one scholar or framework ultimately wins out in theoreti-
cal star-wars, at least as I see it. We become enrolled, persuaded, into certain ap-
proaches, ways of thinking, and stances. Yes, this reflects the qualities of particu-
lar theories, but it also reflects us, our agendas, interests, our affective response. A 
useful way to capture my relationship with the work of Schatzki, Gherardi and 
others, is in the notion of elective affinity, a term used by Max Weber, who bor-
rowed it from a novel by Goethe (see Herbert 1978). Taking a sociomaterial per-
spective, focusing on practice perspectives, and switching gazes multiple times: 
these are all choices, elections. There is nothing automatic or necessary about 
them. From the start the work of working with theory is an entanglement of much 
more than abstract ideas with empirical data. Following Clegg (2012) I wish to 
flag my processes of theorising as complex, messy, and not reducible to inductive 
or deductive logics alone. In reading Clegg’s (2012) account of theorising in 
higher education research, I was struck by a resonance she noted with Hey’s 
(2006) description of working with Judith Butler’s theory. Hey writes of academ-
ics’ commitments to theory: 
How often their own cherished analytical rationality is broken up by glimpses into the 
imagination of more provocative thinkers. I have come to the conclusion that it is not so 
much that we self-consciously assemble all the resources for the making of research 
imaginaries as those vivid ideas (and frequently their authors) come to haunt us. (2006 p 
439) 
It is with this productive notion of haunting in mind that I now turn to the broader 
theoretical framing of this book. 
Sociomaterial approaches and the practice turn 
Major changes are occurring in the ways we understand professional practices and 
learning. Questions are being posed of the body, of materiality, of space and time, 
and of plural, enacted realities. Inherent here are significant shifts in the way we 
conceive what it means to carry out professional work, the nature of professional 
expertise, and the forms of knowledge that are woven into practice and change as 
practice unfolds. The title of Shapin’s (2010) book speaks to this: Never pure: his-
torical studies of science as if it was produced by people with bodies, situated in 
time, space, culture, and society, and struggling for credibility and authority. 
Shapin’s countering of a disembodied trope in accounts of scientific practices, and 
his foregrounding of issues of time and space resonate with contemporary shifts in 
studies of work and learning, and with the specific arguments I'm making in this 
book. The first major theme that I will discuss within this broader territory con-
cerns renewed and distinctive attention to materiality: rethinking the thing. 
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Sociomaterialism: rethinking the thing 
This book is positioned within a broader body of work that may be considered as 
‘sociomaterial’ in its approach. Reference to a group of different but related phi-
losophies, sensibilities and theoretical frameworks as ‘sociomaterial’ has been 
strongly shaped by the writing of Tara Fenwick and her colleagues (Fenwick 
2010a,b, 2012a,b; Fenwick et al 2011, 2012). Complexity theory, cultural-histori-
cal activity theory (CHAT), and actor-network theory (ANT) are prominent (Fen-
wick 2006, 2010a,b, 2012a,b; Fenwick & Edwards 2012), alongside spatiality the-
ories from cultural geography (Fenwick et al 2011). Barad’s (2003, 2007) 
diffractive approach has contributed significantly to this line of thinking and 
shares with Shapin a basis in studies of science, as does much of Pickering’s 
(1992, 1995, 2001) work. There is also a set of perspectives linked by a fore-
grounding of practice, which can be located under a broader sociomaterial um-
brella. These include practice philosophy (Schatzki 1996b, 2002b, 2010c, 2013; 
Reckwitz 2002a,b; Rouse 2007; Kemmis 2009, 2010; Kemmis et al 2012), and 
practice-based approaches coming out of organisational studies (Gherardi 2006, 
2008, 2009a,b, 2012a, b; Orlikowski 2002, 2006, 2007), and others that take up 
questions of knowledge, epistemic cultures, and epistemic work (Jensen et al 
2012b; Knorr Cetina 1997, 1999, 2001; Knorr Cetina & Brueggar 2002; Miettinen 
& Virkkunen 2005; Nerland & Jensen 2012, 2014).  
 
I will first consider the ways in which sociomaterial approaches in general provide 
a platform for rethinking the nature and role of materiality in relation to social 
phenomena. I will then explore practice-focused work, and in particular the con-
cepts from Schatzki, Gherardi and others that are the most direct and pervasive in-
fluences on this book. 
 
Sociomaterial approaches share a view that materially is a crucial dimension of all 
social phenomena, not merely a setting for or adjunct to them (Fenwick et al 
2011). As soon as we conceive of the social, we must also conceive of the mate-
rial. Sørensen (2007, 2009) critiques dominant approaches in which materiality is 
treated as if it does not matter, and the history of educational research for its con-
sistent ignorance when it comes to thing. Fenwick (2012b) similarly argues mate-
riality has been rendered immaterial in much research on learning, while social, 
political and cultural dimensions have received much attention. Markauskaite and 
Goodyear’s (2014) chapter offers a clear account of professional knowledge as 
culturally and socially situated and materially grounded. Action in professional 
practice is viewed by them as an accomplishment of an ‘extended mind’, incorpo-
rating the tools and resources that come to hand in the workplace. 
 
Sociomaterial approaches provide diverse resources for re-thinking ‘the thing’ 
(Fenwick 2010b). Attending to materiality as a constituent of social phenomena 
expands the sorts of questions we can ask about professional work and learning. It 
thus enriches the accounts and explanations we can give of those phenomena. The 
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potentially relevant actors multiply (Fenwick et al 2011; see also Bruni 2005). 
‘Actors’ is a technical term within actor-network theory, but more loosely points 
to the much wider array of objects, artefacts, organisms, and bodies that are at-
tended to in sociomaterial research. Human beings no longer occupy centre-stage, 
and the distinction between human and non-human is blurred, or even wholly un-
dermined (Fenwick 2012a,b; see also Barad 2007). Questions of learning are be-
ing decoupled from a human-centred ontology (Fenwick et al 2011). Dual and 
overlapping roles are implied for human and non-human actors, for material and 
ideal dimensions: professional practices and learning are understood as assem-
blages of materials, ideas, symbols, desires, bodies and natural forces (Fenwick & 
Landri 2012). I will discuss later how this is taken up in Schazki's site ontology – 
the position from which this book is presented.  
 
In sociomaterial approaches, material entities are not simply added in to explana-
tions of social phenomena. There is no non-material core that can be identified 
separately. As Orlikowski puts it, the view is one of ‘constitutive entanglement of 
the social and material in everyday life’ (2007, p 1435 [my emphasis]). Schatzki’s 
(2003) site ontology (see below) uses the term dimension to convey a similar 
point: the social and material are not separate, rather materiality is part of what 
makes up the social. Some, such as Bruni (2005) and those who follow actor-net-
work theory write of symmetry between the human and non-human (see Sayes 
2014). On my understanding this is not about imbuing inert objects with agency of 
the kind that ‘we’ as humans feel we exert in the world. Rather it is to abandon the 
a prior distinction between human and non-human, and to look instead for how 
what looks like agency is an effect of assemblages in which privilege is not given 
either to the human, or non-human, or indeed the conceptual bifurcation of the 
two. Schatzki does not accept the symmetry associated with such post-humanist 
stances, but nonetheless asserts a strong, entangled, and constituent role for mate-
riality (see below). 
Performative, non-representational ontologies 
Grappling with such blurred distinctions requires a crucial, related, move. Rather 
than focusing on stable entities with fixed boundaries held in place by exclusive 
definitions, sociomaterial approaches turn their attention to fluid relationships or 
assemblages. The ontology is based on enactment or performance: reality is pro-
duced, or emerges, through relationships established in practices. Thus Mulcahy, 
writing from an actor-network theory perspective, states ‘reality does not precede 
practices, but is made through them’ (2012b, p 83). Thus sociomaterial approaches 
may be described as based on performative or non-representational (see Thrift, 
2007) ontologies. Barad explains:  
The move towards performative alternatives to representationalism shifts the focus from 
questions of correspondence between descriptions and reality (eg. do they mirror nature or 
culture) to matters of practices/doings/actions. (2003, p 802) 
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More recently, Barad has written: 
Matter is substance in its interactive intra-active becoming, not a thing, but a doing, a 
congealing of agency… mattering is the ongoing differentiating of the world. Matter plays 
an agentive role in its ongoing materialization. Physical matters, matters of fact, matters 
of concern, matters of care, matters of justice, are not separable. (2013, p 17) 
Here, Barad lays out an argument that materiality must be understood as emergent 
and relational, and that through such an approach questions of the good, of ethics, 
of what it makes sense to do, are never immaterial. In the sense that matter is a be-
coming, not a thing, we might conceive of it as made, or practised into being. 
Pickering’s argument that ‘practice is where nature and society and the space be-
tween them are continually made, un-made, and remade’ (1992, p 21) speaks to 
precisely this point (see also Shotter 2013). Drawing on actor-network theory, Mol 
(2002) offers an elegant and eloquent account of how a focus on practice can un-
derpin radically different notions of ontology. Hers is one in which reality multi-
plies, and shows how things, such as bodies, can be enacted into many different 
kinds of being. Performative approaches have been taken up widely, including in 
the feminist scholarship of Butler (eg 1993). Jensen (2010) argues for a shift to 
practical ontology, with specific reference to ideas of knowing and learning as so-
ciomaterial enactments (pointing to key themes I discuss below).  
 
Ideas of non-representationalism and diffraction are worth exploring further. Table 
3.1 below presents excerpts from a fuller table in Barad (2007, pp 89-90). This is 
based on contrasting diffraction with reflection as a key underpinning metaphor. 
Table 3.1 Features of diffraction that resonate with my approach 
Diffraction Reflection 
Diffraction pattern – marking differences from 
within, part of entangled state 
Mirror image – reflection of objects held at a 
distance 
Performativity – subject and object do not pre-
exist as such, but emerge through intra-actions 
Representationalism – pre-existing determinate 
boundary between subject and object 
Entangled ontology – material-discursive phe-
nomena 
Separate entities – words and things 
Intra-acting within and as part of Interacting of separate entities 
Diffraction/difference – intra-acting entangled Words mirror things – social | nature binary 
 
Notice above, the shift from representationalism to performativity. Reality and 
knowledge of it are conceived as emerging through relationships. Boundaries be-
tween material and other phenomena are dismantled in favour of notions of entan-
glement and intra-action. I see parallels between Barad’s intra-action and the way 
Schatzki describes the material and social as constitute dimensions of a site (see 
below). Thrift (2006, 2007) characterises non-representational theory through a 
‘motif of movements’, highlighting performance, multiplicity, porous boundaries 
and emergence rather than entities are seen as ‘preformed’. In his work, things are 
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taken seriously, as are bodies, cyborgs, questions of space, affect2, and practices. 
Indeed in Thrift, concepts such as space are viewed as animate, plural and enacted 
(see below). The human subject is decentred. This idea of performing or enacting 
reality into being is a crucial thread that runs throughout this book. I return to it 
below in discussion of my taking up Schatzki’s site ontology, the notion of emer-
gence, and in the approach to understanding times and spaces as practically pro-
duced (see Chapters 5 and 6).  
 
Such positions also involve a move away from language as a central theme. Thrift 
argues that his approach does not assume language is the ‘main resource of social 
life’ (2007, p 77). Barad argues strongly: 
Language has been granted too much power. The linguistic turn, the semiotic turn, the 
interpretative turn, the cultural turn: it seems that at every turn lately every “thing” – even 
materiality – is turned into a matter of language or some other form of cultural 
representation. The ubiquitous puns on “matter” do not, alas, mark a rethinking of the key 
concepts (materiality and signification) and the relationship between them. Rather, it 
seems to be symptomatic of the extent to which matters of “fact” (so to speak) have been 
replaced with matters of signification (no scare quotes here). Language matters. Discourse 
matters. Culture matters. There is an important sense in which the only thing that does not 
seem to matter anymore is matter. (2003, p 801). 
This sentiment is shared by Schatzki who writes of the ‘impotence’ of language 
and critiques Butler for what he regards as an overly linguistic notion of practice 
which squeezes out nonverbal doings (1996a). “Language and rules (or ‘dis-
course’ in Foucault’s terminology) are important components of social practices. 
So, too, however are nonlinguistic behaviours, behaviours that neither name nor 
declare something” (Schatzki 1996a, p 65). Indeed Caldwell notes3 Schatzki’s 
deep criticism of the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy, suggesting his work is aimed 
at extricating practice theory from dead ends (collapsing practice into language or 
reducing agency to discourse), in a view that holds ‘practices to be ontologically 
more fundamental than language and discourse’ (2012, p 284)4. 
 
Sociomaterial perspectives thus offer a basis for disrupting many features of con-
ventional approaches to researching professional work and learning. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, the critical dimensions of this book are not levelled at the practices 
under examination – the work of professionals on the Residential Unit of Karitane 
– but are instead constituted through the theoretical approach. By taking up socio-
material agendas and commitments, this book undermines and challenges human-
                                                          
2 Affect is one of a number of key themes that readers may notice for their absence in this book. 
See Chapters 1 and 9. 
3 To be fair to Caldwell I should acknowledge that he is critical of Schatzki’s turn away from 
language. 
4 I would acknowledge here that there are many who see a key theoretical challenge of bringing 
language ‘back in’ within practice theoretical accounts, including Somerville and Vella (2015) 
and Green (2015) 
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centred, cognitive, technical and rationalist notions of practice and learning. Per-
formance, enactment and emergence take hold, through a sensitivity to unfolding 
relationships relational rather than stable entities. It joins many others in empha-
sising and bringing into sharper focus the material dimensions of practice and 
learning. Bodies become more (and differently) visible, while questions of time 
and space are complicated. Following Barad (2007), Mol (2002) and Thrift 
(2007), reality multiplies and resists singular representation from a disentangled 
point of view. Below I explain in greater detail the specific ways such ideas are 
taken up in this book with reference to the practice theoretical approach that im-
bues them with particular meaning. However, before this, I will introduce the 
practice turn as a distinctive feature within broader contemporary sociomaterial 
terrain. 
The practice turn 
In his introduction to a widely cited volume Schatzki (2001; Schatzki et al 2001) 
heralds a ‘practice turn’ in contemporary social theory. The term was reinforced 
several years later in Miettinen et al’s (2009) description of a ‘re-turn to practice’, 
and noted by Nicolini (2009b) as a palpable shift in approaches to organisation 
and management studies. Practice turns (plural) might be a more accurate phrase, 
since the places scholars where have turned from, and where they are turning to, 
vary significantly. As Gherardi and Strati (2012) note, there are long traditions in 
sociology and philosophy in which practice occupies a central role. Philosophi-
cally based approaches include what Schatzki (2001a) refers to as practice theory, 
sharing occupation with accounts of social life in general that have other philo-
sophical works (such as Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Aristotle) at their foundation 
(see also Reckwitz 2002a, b). These have been taken up in research by a range of 
scholars pursuing questions of professional practice, learning and education (see 
Green 2009; Green & Hopwood 2015; Hager et al 2012; Kinsella & Pitman 2012; 
Kemmis 2005, 2010; Kemmis & McTaggart 2005; Kemmis & Smith 2008; Kem-
mis et al 2014). Hager (2013) notes how understandings of practice (with its em-
bodied emphasis) within educational research has been resourced by sociomaterial 
perspectives. 
 
What Nicolini (2003) and Gherardi and Strati (2012) call practice-based studies 
has grown out of work more focused on organisations and learning, and has differ-
ent disciplinary and theoretical roots, including communities of practice (Lave & 
Wenger 1991), and more recently actor-network theory. This work is also distinc-
tive in its strong basis in empirical work (see Bruni 2005; Corradi et al 2010; 
Gherardi 2006, 2008, 2009a, b; Gherardi & Landri 2012; Landri 2007, 2012, 
2013; Nicolini 2009a, b, 2011; Nicolini & Roe 2014; Strati 2003, 2005, 2007, 
2008). Landri (2012) explains that the term ‘practice-based’ is used not only to in-
dicate an interest in or study of practice, but empirical approaches that are based 
on explicit theorisations of practice. There is potential for confusion and what may 
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be unnecessary boundary-work in using terms such as sociomaterial, practice the-
ory, and practice-based approaches. In this book I am concerned with how ideas 
drawn from varied approaches resource empirical analysis.  
 
Reich and Hager (2014) outline six5 prominent threads in contemporary theorisa-
tions of professional practice. These draw from diverse sources including organi-
sational studies, philosophy and sociology, and the authors suggest a degree of 
compatibility as the threads apply across approaches including practice theory, ac-
tor-network theory, cultural historical activity theory, and so on. Table 3.2 pre-
sents a summary of their argument. 
Table 3.2 Six prominent threads in theorising practice (after Reich & Hager 2014) 
 Thread Description 
Knowing in practice Practice as a collective and situated process linking knowing, 
working, organising. Echoes of Aristotelian notions of phrone-
sis, and more recent works of Gherardi and Orlikowski, holding 
that knowing is done together 
Sociomateriality Practice as a sociomaterial phenomenon, involving human ac-
tors and non-human objects. Reference to Schatzki, Fenwick, 
Gherardi, Orlikowski and notions of constitutive entanglement 
Embodiment Practices as embodied, happening in and between bodies, in-
cluding through speech acts. Rejection of mind/body dualism. 
Relationality Practices as constituted through shifting, multiple relationships 
between people and other people, materiality, and between prac-
tices. Reality produced through relationships rather than entities. 
Historical and social context Practices as evolving and existing in historical and social con-
texts shaped by social forces including power. Links to literature 
on governmentality. Suggests fluidity and heterogeneity (multi-
plicity) within practices. 
Emergence Practices change and evolve in ways that are not fully specifia-
ble in advance, they are not determined before their occurrence. 
Links with performative ontologies. 
 
Table 3.2 is useful in making links between the practice turn and the sociomaterial 
approaches discussed above. It also rehearses ideas that will be developed more 
fully in the remainder of this chapter, and indeed throughout the book. I will return 
to Hager and colleagues’ work in the next main section when I shift the focus 
from theorising practice to theorising learning.  
 
I wish, briefly, to address the issues that arise in working with both Schatzki’s 
practice theory and Gherardi et al’s practice-based studies in the same empirical 
study. This takes up the question of compatibility raised by Reich and Hager 
(2014). The points I made earlier in reference to Nicolini’s (2009b) notion of 
                                                          
5 This work builds on Hager et al’s (2012) description of five threads. 
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zooming in and zooming out are particularly relevant here. The aim is not to re-
solve theoretical consistency or divergence at an abstract level away from particu-
lar questions asked in relation to particular data. Instead, the drawing on multiple 
theoretical frameworks is justified in terms of the value they add to the empirical 
work – the questions this enables us to pose, and the richer responses that can be 
developed in relation to them. This said, it is important to expose the basis for do-
ing so in terms of theoretical common ground, and to acknowledge the tensions 
that arise in this process. This is particularly so because there are so few refer-
ences made between the two approaches in the existing literature. 
 
Both approaches build around practice as a central and fundamental concept. They 
do this in order to avoid problems associated with binary or dualistic logics of 
structure/agency, mind/body and so on (a project not confined to these writers, see 
Cairns & Malloch 2011; Hodkinson 2005). Both adopt an emergent or performed 
ontology. Gherardi’s (2009a) assertion that practice-based studies bring us closer 
to dasein, Heidegger’s notion of union between thought and action, mirrors 
Schatzki’s (1996b) account of mind/body/action, and the turn to Heidegger in his 
later work (eg. 2007a, 2010c). Gherardi and Strati (2012) describe practice as a 
bridging concept between knowledge and action. I see echoes here of the way 
Schatzki handles the concepts of practice, activity, and the forms of understanding 
that shape them (see below). 
 
Such connections become even more explicit in Corradi et al’s (2010) articulation 
of three key dimensions of practices. The first treats practice as a ‘set of intercon-
nected activities’ (p 277), socially recognised as a way of ordering, stabilising col-
lective action, and built around common orientation. The second focuses on sense-
making, and the third on how practices connect with one another. Each has paral-
lels in Schatzki’s work, in the idea of practices as spaces of multiplicity upheld by 
activities dispersed in time and space, in the idea of practices being shaped by 
what it makes sense for people to do, and in concepts of hanging together. In rela-
tion to this final point, what Gherardi (2006) refers to as ‘texture’ or connected-
ness in action addresses the question of relatedness that emerges as people per-
form their work. Schatzki’s multiple notions of how practices hang together 
provide a different, but complementary, approach to addressing the same core is-
sue. Both are tied to performance, both suggest that to understand practices we 
must not draw boundaries around single practices, but explore connections and re-
lationships between them. 
 
While there are clearly strong resonances between Schatzki’s practice theory and 
the Italian-led approach to practice-based studies, I must also acknowledge their 
differences. Some of these are productive, in the sense that the approaches lead us 
down different lines of enquiry, elucidating features that might otherwise have 
been overlooked – in other words differences that can be mobilised through zoom-
ing in and out based on adoption of different lenses. However, others are more 
fundamental, and require a degree of appropriation on my part. 
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Schatzki’s work is presented as a philosophy of social life. Questions of profes-
sional practices are rarely in focus for their own sake, and learning receives scant 
attention. On the other hand, practice-based studies developed through work dedi-
cated to questions of knowing and learning in the context of (professional) work in 
organisations. This brings concepts that are crucial to this book into much sharper 
relief than in Schatzki’s work. Indeed I found Gherardi’s notion of texture more 
productive in my analysis for certain purposes than Schatzki’s ideas of hanging to-
gether. Texture kept me closer to questions of knowing and learning, and provided 
the foundation for the idea of four essential dimensions that forms the focus of 
Part II. Similarly, the idea of aesthetics receives much richer and more explicit 
treatment in practice-based studies, again maintaining close connections to profes-
sional knowledge and learning (see below). Had I remained exclusively with 
Schatzki, much of value would have been missed. Each approach enables me to 
zoom in on different details of professional practices and learning on the Residen-
tial Unit, and to zoom out in different ways, seeing these details as part of a wider 
picture. 
 
However, while both might be subsumed within a sociomaterial fold, and more 
specifically a ‘practice turn’, I must acknowledge some fundamental differences 
of position. Schatzki defends a residual humanism (see below), while Gherardi 
and others’ work in practice-based studies draws on actor-network theory, which 
is post-humanist in its assumed symmetry between human and non-human (see 
Sayes 2014). This is not a merely aesthetic difference, but one which Schatzki 
(2005) argues is sufficient to claim ontological allegiance between approaches. 
Both propose a strong materiality, though the extent and form of this strength is 
different. To be clear, I adopt Schatzki’s site ontology and follow his residual hu-
manism in this book. In the way I mobilise concepts such as knowing in practice 
and aesthetics, a site ontology allows them to remain sufficiently in tact. Indeed I 
would suggest that the power, value and agility of such concepts is demonstrated 
through their being worked within a process of zooming in and out. 
 
I have located this book within a broader sociomaterial turn, and more particularly 
within dual strands of a practice turn in contemporary social theory. So now I turn 
my attention to explaining in more the particular ontological stance upon which 
my work here is based, and introducing the key concepts that are drawn upon most 
prominently in the analysis presented in subsequent chapters. 
A Schatzkian approach to theorising practice 
I will now explore Schatzki's practice theory as it relates to this book, beginning 
with a brief overview of his work. There are parallels between my approach and 
how Schatzki describes his engagement with the philosophers who inform his 
work: a creative interpretation of Wittgenstein (Schatzki 1996b), and appropriat-
ive interpretation of Heidegger (Schatzki 2010c). What follows is not an objective 
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or neutral rendering of Schatzki’s philosophy, but a selective account focusing on 
those ideas that have the most currency in the context of the analyses that follow. 
It reflects my interpretation of how these concepts can be put to work in empirical 
research. Such gainful use by empirical investigators is, after all, what Schatzki 
(2002, xviii) states that he hopes will be an outcome of his work. I begin by ad-
dressing foundational questions of ontology, and then outline how practices bun-
dle with material arrangements, residual humanism and the idea of practical intel-
ligibility, relationships between practices and activities, how practices are 
organised and hang together, and prefiguration, indeterminacy, stability and 
change. 
 
Schatzki's work on practice theory goes back at least to his critique of Bourdieu 
(Schatzki 1987), and writing on issues of structure and agency (1990). Subsequent 
publications draw explicitly on Wittgenstein (Schatzki 1991, 1993), rehearsing the 
first of three major monographs (1996b). Bourdieu and Giddens remain key refer-
ence points in establishing the distinctiveness of his approach (1997), and Witt-
genstein is sustained as a central foundation (2000b). His site ontology becomes 
highlighted more explicitly in a series of papers as part of an increasing emphasis 
on materiality in his work, along with his defence of a residual humanism (2000a, 
2001b, 2002b, 2003, 2005, 2010a), which marks one of the key developments in 
his second monograph (2002a).  
 
A greater interest in temporality and spatiality then emergences, through papers 
(Schatzki 2006a, b, 2009, 2010b, 2012c), and a book focused on Heidegger 
(2007b). A shift in focus from practices to human activity is clearly marked in his 
latest (2010c) monograph, which weaves through much of the Heideggarian work 
on temporality and spatiality. Some of his more recent works are more summative 
in nature (eg. 2012b), while others take up questions of practice change more ex-
plicitly (2012a, 2013). Throughout this time, Schatzki has moved laterally, for ex-
ample engaging with geographers to consider questions of the body and place 
(2001c). Of note are his (2001a) much-cited chapter within a volume he co-edited 
with Knorr Cetina and von Savigny, which outlines the broader landscape of prac-
tice theory approaches, an his (2007a) paper, offering a succinct account of the 
value of (his) practice theory over other approaches.  
A site ontology 
In this book I adopt Schatzki’s site ontology. In particular, this means a focus on 
practices as they are inherently bundled with material arrangements, from which 
flow notions of performance or enactment that are consistent with a broader socio-
material approach. I see Schatzki’s sense of bundling as conveying relational 
forms that suit the metaphor of entanglement, rather than separate entities having 
some kind of a bearing on one another. In Schatzki practices are not a feature of 
reality, but bring reality into existence. Reality is enacted into being through the 
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many activities that uphold practices. As I explained above, Schatzki is far from 
unique in adopting a view of reality as practised or enacted. However it is im-
portant to be clear about how my working with Schatzki involves a particular take 
on this broader sociomaterial commitment. I join Schatzki’s defence of residual 
humanism as a necessary foundation for the concept of practical intelligibility, 
which proves highly fruitful in the analysis that follows in Parts II and III. I con-
clude this section by considering ways in which a site ontology resonates with (but 
no more) features of a diffractive approach (Barad 2007). 
 
Schatzki's practice theory builds on what he calls a site ontology (or sometimes a 
social ontology). This stems from a view that practices should be treated as the 
fundamental social phenomenon (1996b). However, Schatzki's views of practices 
as materially mediated, and inherently bundled with material arrangements, means 
that he regards materiality as a dimension of social reality. Material arrangements 
do not simply exert an influence on social reality, they are part of it. To borrow 
Fenwick et al’s (2011) terminology, all social reality is sociomaterial reality.  
 
Schatzki writes that ‘practices are intrinsically connected to and interwoven with 
objects... human activity implicates a world amid and with which it proceeds’ 
(2002, p 106 [my emphasis]). A site is a mesh of practices and arrangements of 
people, artefacts, organisms and things (ie. materiality). Practices and material ar-
rangements are viewed as dimensions, rather than separable components of a site 
(2003). ‘To advocate a site ontology is to claim that the character and transfor-
mation of social life are inherently tied to the site of the social’ (Schatzki 2003, p 
177). For me, this quotation translates into a position that says our questions about 
professional practice and learning must attend to the sites at which they unfold.  
 
Consistent with the performative, non-representational principles discussed above, 
these sites comprise and emerge through practices and their shifting but ever-pre-
sent and fundamental relationships with the material world. A practice happens at 
a site, produces it and is also moulded by it (2003). Thus in this book I do not treat 
the buildings and materialities of the Residential Unit as a site (in a physical con-
tainer sense) in or with which professional practices proceed. Rather professional 
practices unfold as material accomplishments, amid material arrangements, and 
produce a site. Emergence is thus taken up as a key metaphor. At the same time, 
those practices are shaped by the site of which they are a constituent part. I will re-
turn to the notion of site in relation to fieldwork in Chapter 4 (see also Schmidt & 
Volbers 2011). 
 
The question of how practices bundle with material arrangements is a crucial one. 
It connects directly with Schatzki’s site ontology, but also expands on what makes 
Schatzki’s position distinct from others. I will briefly outline the many ways in 
which Schatzki suggests practices ‘bundle’ with the material world of bodies, 
(other) organisms, artefacts and objects. As I mentioned previously, when viewed 
together, these forms of bundling create a sense of practices and materiality as be-
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ing entangled, not relating from a distance. These are not all mobilised as distinc-
tive key concepts in my subsequent analysis, but they do provide a basis for a 
more fine-grained understanding of Schatzki’s site ontology. The most important 
concepts are those of bodily performance, practical intelligibility and prefigura-
tion, each discussed further below. The list below draws from a range of texts 
(particularly Schatzki 2002a, 2005, 2010c), and sets these key ideas in a wider 
context.  
 Practices bundle with material arrangements in the sense that both are dimen-
sions of sites (see discussion of ontology above)  
 Activities are always performed bodily. Every professional doing and saying is 
accomplished by a physical, tangible, material body.  
 Practical intelligibility shapes which features of the material world are pertinent 
to practices, when, and how. This connects with Schatzki’s notions of spatial-
ity, and is a major conceptual feature of this book (discussed in greater detail 
below). 
 Material arrangements can prefigure practice. This means that materiality 
shapes what it makes sense to do, makes certain actions more straightforward, 
likely to succeed, efficient, and so on. The architectural arrangements of client 
suites prefigure practices of settling in which professionals and parents retreat 
from the nursery to the corridor.  
 Some practices can only be carried out with particular things in place (you 
can’t rock a cot without a cot); other practices would assume a radically differ-
ent form if materialities that are conventionally pervasive were removed or 
changed. If the clipcharts hanging by each nursery room door were taken out of 
the Residential Unit, a whole cascade of changes would take place, changing 
the character of practices. In these senses, materiality is co-constitutive of prac-
tices. 
 Actions are performed amid, with, and attuned to material entities. Practices of 
supporting parents and children in play are performed amid the toys of the 
playroom in the sense the toys provide a setting, with those toys in the sense 
that they are used or folded into bodily doings and sayings, and are attuned to 
them in the sense that these relationships are not given, but rather emerge 
through interactions between toys and sense-making informed by professional 
expertise. 
 People react to material events and states of affairs, including through causal 
mechanisms. When the sun sets, practices are triggered to manage the effects of 
outside darkness within the walls of the Unit. 
 Materiality may fill out ends or purposes. Many practices on the Unit are di-
rectly related to changing something about the material world – for example the 
exchange of breast milk between mother and child. 
 People are forced to negotiate the physicality of the material world, the physi-
cal properties of things matter, as matter. The physical composition of things 
has significance for social affairs, as, for example, when professionals on the 
Unit have to negotiate the materialities of sound, shape and distance, when 
working with families based in rooms on different corridors (helped, at least, 
16  
by the switch from carpeted to plastic floors, which enables the sounds of cries 
to carry further and more sharply). 
 
These ideas help make sense of the importance of materiality to professional prac-
tices and learning on the Residential Unit (see particularly Chapter 8). Chapter 7 
expands significantly on the second point, bringing bodies into clear focus. Hav-
ing introduced Schatzki’s site ontology and his particular view of the relationship 
between practices and materiality, I can now turn to his defence of residual hu-
manism, and the important concept of practical intelligibility. 
 
Residual humanism and practical intelligibility 
Residual humanism refers to Schatzki’s stance in relation to materiality, and 
whether any a prior distinction between human and non-human makes sense. His 
view, as I understand it, is that while a site ontology certainly presents a strong 
role for materiality in social phenomena, it does retain a distinction between the 
two. This distinction is not one of hard and fast boundaries between exclusive phe-
nomena. It is one that accepts fuzzy and porous boundaries. ‘Residual humanism’ 
points to Schatzki’s reluctance to step as far as others – perhaps labelled as ‘post-
humanists’ – who argue that such distinctions are flawed, and propose a symmetry 
instead. Nicolini refers to Schatzki as an ‘agential humanist’, and summarises his 
interpretation of a Schatzkian ontology thus: 
Schatzki affirms that only humans carry out practices. While he concedes that artefacts do 
have agential power, he suggests that we need to keep human actions and material 
performatance distinct at least for analytical purposes. Although human activity 
implicates a world amid which it proceeds, and albeit materials do exert a direct impact on 
human action… the two are set apart by the notion of intelligibility, and the fact that only 
human actions can attribute intentionality and affectivity… his view is that human co-
existence and organized phenomena emerge from a mesh of people, things and other 
entities. (2012 p. 169 [my emphasis]) 
I see consistency with Pickering’s (1993, 1995, 2001) view that agency does not 
reside, pre-given, inherently in any being or object (human or otherwise), but 
emerges through relationships between the two. Again Nicolini captures the posi-
tion succinctly:  
While human and non-human elements are different, in that intentional agency can be 
attributed to the former but not to the latter; such intentional agency does not emerge in a 
vacuum but within the temporally-emergent structure of real-time practices. (2012, p 170 
[emphasis in original]) 
Thus Pickering (1993, 1995, 2001) refers to a ‘mangle’ of practice, as actions and 
intentions emerge (more or less stable) together through shifting relations between 
the social and material. Pickering suggests neither can prevail in determining what 
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occurs, and on my reading Schatzki’s view is similar: practices remain indetermi-
nate, while some space is reserved for a human notion of intentionality. 
 
I interpret Schatzki’s argument thus: materiality exerts its force in social affairs 
largely by virtue of the way that it becomes intelligible in relation to particular un-
folding practices. The meaning materiality has comes into being only as part of 
practices. Insofar as practices are carried out through bodily doings and sayings, 
and what it makes sense to do is shaped by ends, values and norms, then there is 
an asymmetry, an a priori role for human activity and sense-making. These ideas 
are captured in what Schatzki calls (1996b) practical intelligibility. Objects ac-
quire meaning within practices, and these meanings are practical meanings 
(1996b). This concept proves important in understanding many features of profes-
sional practice and learning on the Residential Unit, including ways in which 
chairs ‘act’ when placed in corridors during settling, the importance of pens, sig-
natures and signing (see also Hopwood 2014c), and the practical significance (in 
the sense of having meaning through and to practice) of dimmer switches, blocked 
out windows, bumps in the floor, mucus, expressed breast milk, and so on (see, in 
particular, Chapter 8). 
 
Schatzki (2002b) holds that the general ends of practices govern the meaning and 
force that particular objects exert in social life. That material arrangements play 
such an important role is therefore due to practices, not something that objects 
force on humans (2002b). Hence the asymmetry, the residual humanism.  
Objects, if you will, make a contribution, but the nature of that contribution depends on 
us. Practices and the arrangements they establish, largely mediate the causal relevance of 
materiality for social life. (Schatzki 2002b, p117)  
How material entities enable and constrain each other, and human activities, de-
pends on their physical properties, yes, but also on the ways they become intelligi-
ble as part of practices. What a person wants, or is intending to do, shapes the rele-
vance of certain physical properties to what is going on. A chair in a dining room 
may be intelligible within practices of eating simply as an object for sitting. How-
ever, the same chair placed in the corridor of the Residential Unit at three o’clock 
in the morning, is intelligible in a different way. Its invitation to sit means some-
thing different. It does work of normalising the time it can take to settle children. 
This is just one example of many discussed in Parts II and III, but suffices to illus-
trate the point. The same chair might be intelligible in many different ways when 
used by a toddler as a support to aid standing.  
 
Notions of intelligibility and the meaning that material entities assume as part of 
practices, preserves a special role for human beings. As far as I am aware, post-
humanist theories do not suggest that objects have agency in themselves, just like 
we traditionally think humans do. Rather they hold that what appears to be agency 
is an effect of assemblages that can never be located exclusively within human or 
non-human categories.  Schatzki’s view is similar in that it is concerned with rela-
tionships and enactment rather than entities. However he does suggest a special 
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role for human beings. My point is not so much that this is a truer or even better 
view than others. Rather it is one that I am drawn to, which makes sense to me, 
and most importantly, which proved highly fruitful in making sense of profes-
sional practices and learning in my ethnographic work. Other ideas that are both 
crucial features of Schatzki’s wider framework, and important in the analysis pre-
sented in Parts II and III of this book concern the relationship between practices 
and activity, and it is to these that I now turn. 
Practices and activity 
To understand how Schatzki’s theory can be used in empirical, ethnographic re-
search, we have to explore the relationship between practices and activity in his 
framework. One of the more often quoted phrases describes practices as ‘embod-
ied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organised around 
shared practical understandings’ (2001a, p 2). We may immediately note the em-
phasis here on bodies and materiality – both are treated as omnipresent and foun-
dational. The organising forces at work include practical understandings, as in the 
quotation, and also rules, teleoaffective structures, and general understandings 
(which I discuss below). Schatzki also describes practices as open, temporally un-
folding and spatially distributed (eg. 2002a, p 20). Human beings coexist by virtue 
of participating in or relating to common social practices (2010c). To understand 
this, it is important to consider the relationship between practices and activities. 
 
‘Practice organisations circumscribe activity. In turn, activity maintains practice 
organisations’ (Schatzki 2010c, p 212). An activity can be performed by one per-
son; practices are nexuses of many activities6 (2012b), while any one activity may 
be performed by an individual. Activity, in Schatzki's terminology, denotes doings 
and sayings, both of which are performed bodily. Some activities further other, re-
lated activities. The activity of rocking a cot forwards and backwards contributes 
to the accomplishment of encouraging an infant to settle. Individual performances 
of these are activities; the spaces of multiplicity comprising many instances of 
such activities, dispersed in space and time, are the practices to which those activi-
ties relate. The practices are spaces of multiplicity because the activities need not 
be identical for them to uphold those wider practices. Practices depend on the on-
going performance of activities in order to continue to exist (Schatzki 2010c, 
2012b, 2013). Practices also govern and shape activities. To practise cot rocking 
implies certain bodily doings. Each activity instantiates and upholds one (or more) 
social practice(s), while being shaped by them. 
 
                                                          
6 Note the difference here between Schatzki’s use of the term ‘activity’ and the meaning of the 
term within Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT), where ‘activity’ refers to collective, 
object-oriented efforts. 
19 
In Schatzki, activities share many of the properties of practices, including their in-
herent bundling with material arrangements. This is crucial, because activities be-
come a window onto wider practices. Practices cannot, by Schatzki's definition, be 
observed in a single moment. Activities, however, can. Because activities are ex-
pressions of the forces that organise practices, we can learn about practices by 
studying activities (see below). Each activity of settling an infant expresses the 
rules, practical and general understandings, and teleoaffective structures that gov-
ern the wider practices of settling. Thus in my ethnographic work, my role was to 
describe (and become entangled in, see Chapter 4) activities of the Unit. Empirical 
data relating to these activities provide a kind of ‘clearing’ through which light is 
shone upon professional practices on the Unit, particularly because so many activ-
ities were observed so many times. In turn, these practices provide a window onto 
the wider spaces of multiplicity that include practices performed by professionals 
in similar contexts, and practices associated with wider challenges and changes 
unfolding across many professions.  
 
This logic underpins how Kemmis (Kemmis & Grootenboer 2008; Kemmis et al 
2014; see also Hopwood et al 2013; Hopwood 2014c) argues that we can see ‘big’ 
forces, such as professional norms, ethics, regimes of accountability and so on, 
through ‘small’ instances. Indeed the two are so entangled it makes little sense to 
refer to them in this way. There are no ‘big’ forces or patterns outside of ‘small’ 
instances, and no ‘small instances’ that are not shaped by and contributing to those 
wider phenomena. It is thus that we can move from detailed empirical details from 
one particular ‘site’ to constructing answers to the much broader questions that I 
posed in Chapter 1 – questions about the changing nature of professional practice, 
the role of professional expertise and learning in partnership-based work, and so 
on.  
How practices are organised and hang together 
As we saw above, an activity, and its associated doings or sayings belong to a 
practice if they express components of that practice’s organisation. I will now ex-
plain the four key components of this organising referred to in the quotation be-
low: 
A practice is a temporally evolving, open-ended set of doings and sayings linked by 
practical understandings, rules, teleoaffective structures, and general understandings. 
(Schatzki 2002a, p 87). 
The notion of organising here has a sense of shaping or arranging, but also one of 
coexistence. Schatzki writes repeatedly of hanging together as a metaphor for how 
practices and activities relate to one another. This is deliberately non-hierarchical, 
imagining a (slightly thick) horizontal plane. Where practices (and the activities 
that uphold them) are governed by the same understandings, rules, or teleoaffec-
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tive structures, they hang together through commonality. They may also hang to-
gether through orchestration, where some or all of those structures differ, but 
there remain non-independent relationships between them. The connections I de-
scribe in this book are largely those of commonality, given my empirical focus in 
such a contained professional setting. I expand on each of the organising forces 
below, as these are drawn upon in the analyses presented in Parts II and III. How-
ever I would signal that overall, Gherardi’s notion of texture (connectedness in ac-
tion) is taken up more pervasively and deeply, including its expansion through the 
dimensions of times, spaces, bodies and things. 
 
Practical understandings (Schatzki 1996a, b, 2002a, 2010c) denotes know-how 
that enables people to carry out actions that it makes sense to perform. They build 
on the ability to carry out bodily actions. A nurse on the Residential Unit knows 
how to rock a cot back and forth, pat a mattress, burp a baby, stand still and calm 
during settling or a tantrum, and so on. Of note is Schatzki's association of the 
word ‘understandings’ with the body. This points to his notion of the instrumental 
body (discussed below). But it also reflects the view that knowledge and under-
standing are not properties of the mind that are simply enacted by the body. Practi-
cal understandings also include dimensions such as rhythm, pace, tone, gesture, 
and more aesthetic qualities of bodily doings and sayings. In the context of profes-
sional practices described in this book, these aesthetic qualities are extremely im-
portant, hence I turn to Gherardi and Strati’s work (see below). 
 
By rules, Schatzki means formulations, principles, precepts, and instructions that 
enjoin, direct or remonstrate people to perform some actions and not others 
(2002)a. These need not be rules set out explicitly as such. Indeed one of the ways 
normativity shapes what makes sense for people to do is through rules. What it 
makes to someone to need not equate to what is rational to do (2010c). Emotions 
may inflect the determination of practical intelligibility, and thus also mediate the 
way in which rules and normativity shape practices. Linking back to the ideas pre-
figuration and indeterminacy, we can say that these do not determine activity, but 
rather forms part of the context in which people act, influencing what it makes 
sense to do. Rules, whether explicit and specific articulations, or more implicit and 
diffuse norms and traditions, do not determine what happens. Professional prac-
tices on the Residential Unit are organised by numerous rules, some of which be-
come more apparent than others in the remainder of this book. There are rules re-
lating to the operation of a ‘well person facility’, which organise practices of 
monitoring for signs of illness (see Chapter 6). There are rules relating to child 
protection, and forms of accountability that shape what is documented and signed 
off, when, and by whom (see also Hopwood 2014c).  
 
The idea of teleoaffective structures refers to ends, purposes, projects, beliefs, and 
emotions that become normative in a practice. They shape questions of what is 
right to, what one ought to do (which in turn shape, but do not determine, what it 
makes sense to do) (1996b). To say a practice is shaped by a teleoaffective struc-
ture is not to say all participants in it share a uniform, singular collective set of 
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ends. However, intentions and attachments are crucial to understanding how activ-
ities performed by different people hang together. On the Residential Unit, the 
idea of partnership, and in particular the Family Partnership Model (FPM; see 
Chapter 2) are significant features of such structures. In turn, they are part of val-
ues, ethics and a commitment to a sense of ‘good’ that are shared by professions 
across the Unit, and indeed services for children and families more widely. Signif-
icantly, the FPM attaches affective significance to, and orients practical intentions 
towards, not only the outcome of supporting families, but features of the process, 
too. For example, in partnership, professionals seek to ensure that parents feel lis-
tened to, and respected in empathetic, non-judgemental ways. We may note reso-
nances here between Schatzki’s concept and Gherardi and others’ (Gherardi 2009; 
Gherardi et al 2007) emphasis on passion and passionate attachment in practice. 
This idea also comes up in relation to materiality, and the ‘textured intimacy’ be-
tween people and objects (see Jensen 2012; Knorr Cetina 2001; Knorr Cetina & 
Brueggar 2002; Miettinen & Virkkunen 2005; Nerland & Jensen 2012, 2014; and 
Chapter 8). 
 
The concept of general understandings refers to understandings that we rely on in 
our recognition of certain practices (Schatzki 2002a). To recognise and agree that 
a particular practice is in evidence, we must draw on general understandings of 
what that practice constitutes. General understandings also refer to things like 
manners of conduct. This is thus a broader concept than the bodily know-how of 
practical understandings. In my (admittedly flexible) appropriation of the concept, 
I also include the sense of relatively stable professional knowledge bases. For ex-
ample, there are understandings about child and family nursing that enable us to 
recognise practices as child and family nursing practices, and to distinguish them 
from other kinds of practices. There are understandings about what it means to act 
professionally as a child and family health nurse. And there are also understand-
ings about anatomy, child development, attachment, and so on. While Schatzki 
doesn’t (as far as I can tell) explicitly designate these within his organising forces, 
to me it makes sense to do so, and particularly proves fruitful in the analyses pre-
sented in Part III (see Hopwood et al 2014 for further explanation and application 
of this idea). 
 
Practical understandings, rules, teleoaffective structures, and general understand-
ings all influence what it makes sense to do and how the material world becomes 
practically intelligible as practices unfold. Exactly what this ‘influence’ looks like, 
and how strong it is, brings us to consider Schatzki’s concepts of prefiguration and 
indeterminacy. 
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Prefiguration and indeterminacy, stability and change 
A brief examination of agency within Schatzki’s framework is an important prel-
ude to understanding the concepts of prefiguration and indeterminacy. Schatzki ar-
gues that ‘what people are capable of doing depends in part on the people, organ-
isms, things, and artefacts around them’ (2002a, p 208). While he aims to 
‘vindicate the integrity and unique richness of human agency’ (p 193; further 
traces of his residual humanism are apparent here), such agency is contingent, not 
absolute. This clearly debunks any notion of a form of agency that stems from in-
dividuals per se. Agency is a relational, arising through, or an effect of, bundles of 
practices and material arrangements at particular sites. There is, as I have ex-
plained above, asymmetry here, a sense of capacity that people have to bring 
about to commence, continue or change events in the world (Schatzki 2002a, 
2013).  
 
Prefiguration refers to the ways in which bundles of practices and arrangements 
make particular courses of action easier, harder, simpler, more complicated, 
shorter, longer, ill-advised, promising of ruin or gain, riskier or safer, more or less 
feasible, and so on (see 2002a, p 225). Prefiguration does not clear some paths and 
obliterate others, but rather figures them with different qualities or associated in-
telligibility in terms of what it makes sense to do. Courses of action can be made 
more or less difficult, threatening, distinct, and so on. A nurse’s route through the 
Unit may be prefigured by its spatial layout and its temporal routines, which shape 
whether families are likely to be in the dining room, playroom or nursery, and her 
purpose in seeking contact with families. Handover practices are prefigured in dif-
ferent ways and to different degrees – a feature I pick up in Chapter 9 through re-
lated notions of choreography in order to highlight the patterning of bodies, move-
ments, spatial relations, rhythms and objects. This patterning is one of many 
instances and effect of prefiguration evidence in professional practices on the Res-
idential Unit. Manidis and Scheeres (2013) see prefiguration as a central quality of 
practices, viewing it as key to understanding how practices prevail. 
 
Indeterminacy brings questions of agency and prefiguration together. Schatzki 
(particularly 2002a, 2010c) argues that nothing determines what a person does be-
fore the act is done. By extension, whatever causes or leads to that action is not 
fixed until the moment of its performance. ‘Until a person acts, it remains open 
just what he or she will have done’ (2002a, p 232). Indeterminacy gives practices 
and the future the openness that has been mentioned before, and retains important 
temporal qualities liked to intentionality that will be discussed below. While 
Schatzki accepts that people, and thus practices, are strongly shaped by norma-
tivity, there is always possibility for change (see also 2013). ‘All the prefiguration 
in the world cannot sew up agency before it occurs’ (2002a, p 233). This brings us 
back to the metaphor of emergence: practices are not determined in advance, and 
the realities they produce therefore emerge. 
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The accounts I give in Parts II and III are not ones of wider change in the ways 
practices on the Unit unfold or organised, nor are there stories of individual pio-
neers trailblazing changes, deviating radically from the prefigured patterns and 
routines of their work. Indeed in some ways, the practices I describe are remarka-
bly stable. However, Schatzki (2013) holds that stability and change are not the 
exclusive opposites of one another, but rather constantly co-occur (see also Price 
et al 2012; Tsoukas & Chia 2002). Indeed as I introduce below, and elaborate in 
Chapter 9, professional practices on the Unit unfold amid myriad subtle and less 
subtle, minor and less minor changes. I associate the maintenance of connected-
ness in action (texture), its repair, restoration and modification, and the production 
of new textures, with the idea of professional learning, when they further the ends 
of practices through meaningfully altered interpretations and actions. Thus 
Schatzki’s notion of indeterminacy opens up a view of simultaneous instability 
and preservation of practices that, in turn, enables us to explore what and how pro-
fessionals learn as they work (together). Having gone into some detail about 
Schatzki’s practice theory, I know turn my attention to questions of knowledge, 
knowing and learning. 
 
Theorising knowledge, knowing and learning in professional 
practice 
In this section I continue to engage with existing theoretical literature, as a way to 
frame the theoretical aspects of this book, and introduce some of the key concepts 
that are drawn upon later. I shift now to focus knowledge, knowing and learning. I 
begin by describing recent shifts in workplace learning research, in which the met-
aphor of emergence has become prominent. This links directly to the changes and 
critiques at play in the broader sociomaterial agendas discussed above. I then ad-
dress concepts of knowledge and professional expertise, knowing in practice, and 
aesthetics. Here, Schatzki is backgrounded somewhat, and the work of Jensen, 
Nerland, Gherardi, Strati and others is brought to the fore. 
 
This book is located within, and contributes to, a distinctive approach to research-
ing workplace learning, specifically learning in professional practice. This ap-
proach relates closely to the sociomaterial and practice turns outlined above, alt-
hough it is in some ways broader than this. Emergence is taken up as a key 
metaphor of learning, rather than participation, or acquisition and transfer. Emer-
gence points to complex temporalities, the non-specifiability of the knowledge 
needed to perform particular practices or carry out professional work, the role of 
judgement, and continual interpretation and reinterpretation that go on in practice, 
all of which give practices suspense and uncertainty. Drawing particularly on 
Hager’s (2011, 2012) accounts of historical developments in workplace learning 
24  
research, I will now provide more details, linking the discussion of practices to 
questions of learning. 
 
Hager (2011) traces a series of shifts, initially from behaviourism to more cogni-
tive approaches influenced by psychological theory, particularly those associated 
with Schön’s work on reflective practice. The basis of this approach in acquisition 
and transfer metaphors of knowledge, the treatment of learning as a product or 
thing (often independent of context), and the individual as the primary unit of 
analysis, have all been targets for sustained criticism. In response, according to 
Hager's account, various sociocultural theories emerged. Rather than treating 
knowledge as an entity held by and transferred between individuals, different units 
of analysis were used, focusing more on collective and social dimensions, framed 
around a metaphor of participation (eg. Lave 1988; Lave & Wenger 1991; Wenger 
1998).  
 
These approaches reject cognitive / technical rationality, and place emphasis on 
thinking and acting rather than acquiring knowledge. They extend the work of 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988, 1999) in which the body emerged more strongly in 
accounts of learning and cognition (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1999). This work formed 
a central feature in studies of organisational learning and situated cognition under-
taken in Italy, by Gherardi and others (eg. Gherardi 1995; 2000b), before their 
later turn towards actor-network theory and ‘practice-based studies’. Hager (2011) 
locates Eraut's (2000, 2004a,b, 2007a,b) work within this tradition, alongside that 
of Billett (1998, 2006, 2009, 2010a,b, 2011, 2014; Billett & Somerville 2004; Bil-
lett & Smith 2010, 2014; Billett et al 2005, 2014), Boreham & Morgan (2004), 
and some variants of activity theory (eg. Blackler 1993, 1995; Guile & Young 
1998). Some of the earlier work by Fuller et al (2005; 2007) and Fuller and Unwin 
(2003) also demonstrates the insights afforded through theories of learning an-
chored to the idea of participation. 
 
Hager (2011) frames this third trance around the central metaphor of emergence 
(see also Fenwick 2008). This is related to ideas of becoming, practice, and tem-
poral dimensions in fluid, ever-shifting contexts. He makes links between it and 
broader postmodern traditions, though I find the terms ‘post-Cartesian’ (used by 
Hager et al 2012b) as this points more directly to the rejection of mind/body dual-
ism (see below). Hager asks, if practices have emergent properties, why should the 
same not apply to learning? Practices and reality can be understood as co-emerg-
ing: practices unfold through actions, interactions and the assemblages they pro-
duce and are shaped by; social reality is a sociomaterial accomplishment, or 
emerging effect, of these practices.  
 
Within this third tranche, Hager identifies learning-focused research informed by 
sociomaterial approaches including actor-network theory, practice theory, prac-
tice-based studies and (some variants of) cultural historical activity theory 
(CHAT). The latter seems apt given strong notions of material mediation 
(Engeström 1999; 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011; Engeström et al 1999; Mäkitalo 2012), 
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and emphasis on relationality (see Edwards 2005b, 2007, 2009, 2010; Edwards & 
Daniels 2012; Edwards & Darcy 2004; Edwards et al 2009, 2010). The extensive 
work done in this guise has produced a rich and diverse literature, bringing a range 
of contemporary theories into contact with questions of learning and work. Some 
examples include: the actor-network theoretical work of Mulcahy (2012a-c, 2013), 
Somerville (2010), Aberton (2012b); Fenwick and Edwards (2010, 2012); the 
practice-based studies of Gherardi (2001, 2006, 2009a-c, 2012a,b; Gherardi & 
Strati 2012; Nicolini (2009a, b, 2011, 2012; Nicolini et al 2003) and others, (as in-
troduced above and discussed further below); the practice theoretical work 
brought together by Green (2009a-c), Green and Hopwood (2015a-c), Hager et al 
(2012), and Kemmis et al (2014); studies of epistemic cultures and practices by 
Jensen, Nerland and others (Jensen et al 2012b; Nerland & Jensen 2012, 2014); 
and other work focusing on knowledge, knowing and materiality in organisations 
(Antonacopoulou 2008; Carlile et al 2013a,b; Hydle & Breunig 2013; Orlikowski 
2002, 2006, 2007; Orlikowski & Scott 2013; Orlikowski & Yates 2002; Tsoukas 
2008, 2009; Sandberg & Tsoukas 2011). Shotter’s (1996a,b, 2001, 2004, 2005, 
2008, 2013) work is also of note. We might also note the uptake of such ideas in 
educational research more broadly (rather than specifically workplace learning), as 
illustrated in Nespor’s (1994, 1997, 2002, 2012) and Sørensen’s (2009) studies of 
formal education and Aberton’s (2012a) work on learning in everyday community 
settings. 
 
Gherardi writes that ‘practice-based approaches to learning and knowing in organ-
isations share a common interest in the construction and maintenance of shared or-
ders as emergent phenomena and interactional effects’ (2006, p 52). Knowledge as 
possession, and learning as transfer of knowledge are almost atemporal in their 
conception, save perhaps a basic sequential chronology. Participation explicitly in-
vokes temporality through notions of trajectories, strongly characterised by ideas 
of novices or apprentices learning to become full members of communities (re-
flecting the basis of much participation-focused work on studies of apprentice-
ship). Emergence opens up questions of time and temporality, and in particular 
challenges notions that learning required for successful performance in any occu-
pation can be specified in advance. If practices are emergent, and their emergence 
continually produces social realities, then learning must emerge with practice. 
While patterns and stabilities in social life and their prefiguring effects (see above) 
do not preclude us from anticipating how practices will unfold, we cannot fix what 
must be known in order to carry out work or a particular activity prior to its un-
folding.  
 
Hager (2011) concludes that one of the most significant outcomes of theoretical 
developments in this field has been the realisation that for any job to be per-
formed, learning must be happening. Practices cannot go on for any sustained pe-
riod without learning, irrespective of how experienced the practitioners are. As I 
discuss below, this does not mean that I collapse practice and learning into one an-
other as concepts, nor do I argue that all activities undertaken in the conduct of 
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professional work require and bring about learning. The concept of emergence 
gives us a coherent way in to this view.  
 
Professional practices are emergent phenomena. This emergence provides a con-
stant pressure to learn. In Part III I discuss in particular how shifts to partnership-
based approaches (as described in Chapter 2) intensify this learning imperative 
and infuse it with distinctive relational qualities. Hager (2012) argues that learning 
is an essential part of good practice. I interpret the word ‘essential’ here not only 
to mean necessary, but also in the sense ‘is part of the essence of’ (I use the term 
in the same way in reference to four essential dimensions of practice and learning, 
see below; also Hopwood 2014a). This point is echoed by Jensen et al (2012a) 
who describe increasing requirements for professionals not only to apply or enact 
knowledge, but to participate in producing and sharing new knowledge. Practice is 
not held secure by a stable, fixed body of knowledge. Rather its accomplishment 
is responsive, unpredictable, and indeterminate. Professional practice cannot be 
conceived without learning (though this does not mean they should be conceived 
as synonymous or the same thing). Chapters 9 and 10 explicitly explore the learn-
ing that goes on as professional practices at Karitane unfold – the former focusing 
on what and how professionals learn from families and each other (through my ex-
panded concepts of connectedness in action), the latter on the professional learn-
ing that is inherently interlaced with practices that are pedagogical in nature. Any 
discussion of learning must address questions of knowledge; when our focus is on 
learning in the process of work, then questions of professional expertise must also 
be in the frame. It is to these, and their connections, that I now turn. 
Knowledge and professional expertise 
Despite increasing reference to knowing (see below), there remains significant 
value in approaching questions of professional practice and learning with refer-
ence to knowledge (as a noun). This does not mean that we revert back to 
knowledge as an entity residing in individual heads, but it does mean that we can 
consider forms of expertise and understanding that are more or less stable, shared 
across communities, and to some degree characteristic of particular professions 
and fields. For example, Guile (2012, 2014) talks about professional knowledge in 
terms of continuous recontextualisation, embedded in workplace practices and ar-
tefacts, used by professionals to address challenges that arise in the conduct of 
work. Drawing on CHAT, this does not cleave knowledge into some abstract, ide-
alised entity wholly divorced from practice, but it does not rely on a wholly per-
formative notion of knowing either. Guile offers valuable insights into forms of 
reasoning in theoretical and professional ways while retaining a strong grip on the 
notion of ‘content’ that has some meaning outside of in-the-moment actions (at 
least, this is my reading of his work). 
 
27 
Indeed Young and Muller position the whole volume (of which Guile’s chapter is 
one contribution; Young & Muller 2014b) as putting ‘the sociological study of 
professional knowledge into the centre of scholarly focus in research on profes-
sions and their formation’ (2014a p 5). They add: 
We have noted in earlier work how the exclusive stress on the ‘can do’ side of 
knowledge… can impair educational provision. It is the distinctive socio-epistemic 
properties of different kinds and bodies of knowledge that are put to use by members of 
professions in problem-solving and other kinds knowledgeable practice that is our 
singular concern in this volume. (2014a, p 5) 
This statement is qualified by an explanation that this does not necessitate or im-
ply a strong split between knowledge and action – something they acknowledge 
would be especially counterproductive in the context of professional knowledge. 
They write instead of a blurred continuum between the two, where distinctions are 
analytical (rather than, I assume, of an ontological nature). Their interest in the 
specialised knowledge involved in particular practices is located towards one end 
of this continuum, where I imagine notions of knowing in practice (Gherardi, Or-
likowski and others, see below) might lie at the other. Perhaps in between these is 
the work of Jensen, Nerland and others. This is centred around ideas of epistemic 
cultures – those that create and warrant knowledge – and the epistemic or 
knowledge work that is wound up in professional practices, where expert 
knowledge is not always certain (see Jensen et al 2012a). Nerland and Jensen 
(2014) write of professional knowledge cultures, understanding professional learn-
ing in relation to wider ecologies of knowledge and practice. They view ongoing 
participation in professional practices as conditional upon enrolment in collective 
but also specific ways of knowing – an enrolment that is never finished7. 
 
Jensen et al’s (2012b) volume reports outcomes of a large empirical project fo-
cused on learning and expertise in a range of professional contexts. They explore 
contemporary professional work in terms of engagement in knowledge practices 
that go way beyond application, but involve epistemic work of exploring, testing, 
validating, and sharing what is or comes to be known (Jensen et al 2012b). They 
draw on Knorr Cetina’s (1997, 1999, 2001; Knorr Cetina & Brueggar 2002) work, 
particularly concepts of epistemic cultures and objects, highlighting knowledge 
and knowledge work as phenomena that bind professions and professionals to-
gether. As Lahn (2012) notes, this avoids the performative inscription of ‘know-
ing’, but shares a strong materiality with a broader sociomaterial and practice per-
spective, and close connection to unfolding action. Their analysis opens up 
fascinating questions about passionate attachment to knowledge and objects (Jen-
sen 2012), non-knowledge and linked notions of awareness, intentionality and sta-
bility (Jensen & Christiansen 2012), and how workplaces may stimulate and sup-
port professional learning through a match between knowledge practices and 
knowledge resources (Klette & Carlsten 2012; Klette & Smeby 2012). Nerland’s 
                                                          
7 Interestingly, Gherardi and Perrota (2014) make a similar point relating to professional becom-
ing as ongoing; they draw on a different notion of knowing, and place greater emphasis on ten-
sions and contradictions. 
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(2012) piece clearly eschews an individual unit of analysis, and also steps away 
from social participation as a metaphor, engaging instead with questions of profes-
sional knowledge and learning in terms of temporality and spatiality, mediation, 
and circulation. 
 
Young and Muller (2014) find Jensen et al’s (2012b) work rather too far in the di-
rection of ‘can do’ and ‘practice’ of knowledge-based professions. However, as I 
see it, both bodies of work share a commitment to, and beautifully illustrate, the 
value of working with the concept of knowledge in sociomaterial research on pro-
fessional practices and learning. In particular this speaks strongly to the issues 
raised in Young and Muller’s introduction: 
In the present climate of the ‘knowledge economy’, ‘knowledge work’ and ‘expert 
occupations’, there is simultaneously concern about the increase in the riskiness of 
professional judgement, the threat that codification and standardisation poses to the 
autonomy and discretion of the traditional ‘liberal’ professional, and a residual suspicion 
about the probity and trustworthiness of all professions and professional judgement. 
(2014, p 4). 
Thus, in this book I do work with the concept of professional knowledge. It pro-
vides a coherent basis for my appropriation of Schatzki’s (2002) idea of ‘general 
understandings’ (see above), and enables me to elucidate features of professional 
expertise and learning that would not be apparent if I was tied exclusively to per-
formative notions of knowing. This is not about hedging my theoretical bets, or 
seeking to produce a hybrid compromise. It is about being playful and agile, draw-
ing on varied concepts as long as they enrich the analysis, and share a consistent 
basis within broader sociomaterial canons. In the next subsection I will outline 
features of the more performative concept, knowing, as these too provide an im-
portant reference in the remainder of this book. 
Knowing in practice 
Performative concepts of knowing are a hallmark of a significant body of research 
on professional practice and learning. This is so particularly within the fold of 
practice-based studies associated with Gherardi, Strati, Bruni and Nicolini, but 
also with the work of Orlikowski, which similarly comes out of organisational 
studies. The essence of the idea is this: rather than conceiving of knowledge, 
something that is held, we conceive of knowing, something that is done – a shift 
from noun to verb (see Gherardi & Nicolini 2000 for an early adumbration of the 
idea). Given this has developed within sociomaterial and practice-based traditions, 
this doing is understood as a doing together, and one that is never separated from 
materiality. Thus knowing is treated as a phenomenon that emerges through fluid 
relationships that are established (and I would add, unravelled, repaired, restored, 
modified) in practice. “The study of knowing in practice prefers action verbs to 
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transmit the idea of an emergent reality, of knowing as a material activity” (Cor-
radi et al 2010). This is a foundation for much of this book, particularly Part II, 
which takes up the idea of texture or connectedness in action – ideas for which 
knowing in practice is a crucial basis. 
 
I will now explain the idea in more detail, pointing to some of the premises behind 
it, and its important implications. There is now a large literature around this con-
cept and its application in research, and I make no attempt to capture this here. In-
stead I focus on those aspects that feed most directly into the analyses that follow 
in Parts II and III. 
 
Gherardi et al (2007) write that (organisational) knowledge is not solely mental, it 
does not reside in the brain of the human body, nor does the body serve as its in-
strument. This is an important starting point, as it locates us firmly in a post-Carte-
sian terrain in which mind/body dualisms are dismantled (see Hodkinson [2005] 
for a discussion of mind and body as a troubling dualism in our understanding of 
learning). Bruni et al offer a powerful introduction to the idea of knowing in prac-
tice: 
When we conceive knowledge as a substance, we see it as materialised in objects; when 
we conceive it as a property, we see it as owned by individuals. (2007, p 85). 
They argue that the concept of practice provides a way to theorising knowing and 
work, enabling us to capture the materiality and indeterminacy of specific forms 
of knowing. The echoes of sociomaterialism (as I outlined it above) are loud and 
clear here. Corradi et al (2010) suggest that practices constitutes the topos that ties 
knowing to doing (here I understand topos close to its original Greek sense of 
‘place’ or ‘site’). Knowing is structured in practice through relation to the objects 
and artefacts that are folded into professionals’ everyday work.  
 
Nicolini’s writing on this concept conveys many aspects that are highly relevant to 
the way I take it up in this book. He notes: 
Knowing, for example, transpires particularly through the sayings and doings, the tempo 
and rhythm of the practice, the objects used in the course of the activity, the interactional 
order and accountability regime, and how deviations and innovations are taken into 
account and dealt with. (2011, p 609). 
Of note here are the explicit links he makes with ideas of ‘doings and sayings’ 
(Schatzki’s vocabulary is echoed here), and temporality and rhythm – ideas taken 
up in Chapter 5. His focus on objects and accountability rehearses the way I ex-
plore questions of partnership, responsibility and signatures (Hopwood 2014c). It 
is important also to acknowledge that knowing in practice is not an exclusively a 
concept associated with Gherardi and her co-authors. Orlikowski (2002, 2006 
2007; Orlikowski & Scott 2013; Orlikowski & Yates 2002) has also written exten-
sively on this idea. She writes: 
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Knowing is not a static embedded capability or stable disposition of actors, but rather an 
ongoing social accomplishment, constituted and reconstituted as actors engage the world 
in practice. (2002, p 249) 
The parallels with the Gherardian idea are evident: knowledge is produced and re-
produced in social practices, ‘always in the making’ (2006, p 460). My under-
standing, use and appropriation of the idea is informed much more heavily by 
Gherardi’s work, hence my primary reference to her and her colleagues’ texts. 
 
Adopting the concept of knowing in practice means we let go of knowledge as 
mental substance, and instead focus on the practical accomplishment of knowing, 
tracing what people do together, materially (Gherardi 2006). The researcher inter-
ested in questions of expertise and learning, therefore, focuses on the doing, and 
the materiality of social relations (Gherardi & Nicolini 2002). As practitioners per-
form the activities that uphold or reproduce practices, they embody and enact the 
knowing required to do so. However, the indeterminacy of practices (note the par-
allels with Schatzki; see above), means that practice and knowing are mutually 
constituted, each shaping and shaped by the other. Where Schatzki (1996b) refers 
to what it makes sense for someone to do, Gherardi (2006) refers to a ‘situational 
logic resulting from the connections in practice among practitioners, artefacts, 
context and the normative and aesthetic codes which sustain the performance of 
practice’ (2006, p 230).  
 
Here the notion of connections comes into sharper view. Gherardi’s (2006) con-
cept of texture or connectedness in action, is a major conceptual anchor for my 
work in this book. She holds that practices are nested with each other, forming a 
texture that may be locally dense to varying degrees. Schatzki (2002b, see above) 
conceives practices as hanging together through shared practical and general un-
derstandings. I see Gherardi’s notion of texture as occupying similar conceptual 
terrain. Both point explicitly to questions of knowing, tied intimately to the ‘ac-
tion’ of unfolding practice, both heavy with materiality and bodies. To me, the 
idea of connectedness in action is wonderfully open and fluid. Indeed, Part II is 
devoted largely to expanding this concept as a means to understand professional 
practices and learning, by teasing out four essential dimensions of texture (times, 
spaces, bodies and things).  
 
I introduce these in the next main section, but before this I draw out a key feature 
of practice-based approaches to conceiving knowing: aesthetics. Insofar as I mobi-
lise the concept in this book, it does not sew up questions of practice, knowing and 
learning by enabling us to collapse one onto the other, to use them interchangeably 
– these are issues I take up in the final section of this chapter.  
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Aesthetics 
Schatzki (1996b) refers explicitly to aesthetic qualities of bodily doings and say-
ings, and to practical understandings (bodily know-how) including aspects such as 
rhythm, pace, tone, gesture and so on. Attending to aesthetics is a crucial part of a 
broader countering of technical and rationalist approaches to understanding pro-
fessional practice, learning and expertise – a critical disruption that is central to 
the sociomaterial and practice theoretical agenda (this carries forward to my argu-
ment about the nature and place of critique in this book, discussed in Chapter 4). 
However, despite his explicitness, Schatzki does not develop this point in great de-
tail. Fortunately, aesthetics is brought into sharp and nuanced focus within prac-
tice-based studies in a Stratian and Gherardian guise. 
 
As mentioned above, aesthetic codes are viewed as one form or source of connec-
tion among practitioners, objects and wider context (Gherardi 2006). Here, aes-
thetics is imbued with particular meaning – in fact, meaning that makes it broader 
than its everyday usage, which is often focused on (visual) judgements or appreci-
ation of beauty. Aesthetics refers to having an eye, ear, nose (and so on) for partic-
ular features of practice which may be tangible or intangible, explicitly articulated 
or otherwise (Strati 2003). Through an aesthetic lens we can value the corporeal 
and interpersonal nature of knowing – rejecting Cartesian mind/body dualism and 
notions of knowledge being held in individual minds, and implemented in a ra-
tional process of cognition translated into action. 
 
Gherardi et al (2007) highlight the salience of aesthetic ways of knowing, sensory 
work, and expressions of judgement based on taste (see also Gherardi 2009c). 
Knowing in practice incorporates (the corporeality here is deliberate) knowledge 
gained through the senses, and aesthetic judgments made as people go about prac-
tices (Corradi et al 2010). Strati’s (1992) describes two offices, and compares 
them on an aesthetic basis. In doing so he drew attention to the fact that profes-
sional practices and organisations are not devoid of question s of beauty, the sub-
lime, sacred, graceful, ugly and picturesque. As he later notes, aesthetics pervades 
everyday life in workplaces (2008). It is important to note that Strati’s (1992) ac-
count documents not only the physical environment, but also the aesthetic quali-
ties of actions – doings and sayings. Aesthetics are not confined to questions of 
artwork hanging on walls, or architectural design. They are lived, spoken, done, 
performed, practiced.  
 
Strati (2003) illustrates his meaning through an example of men working on a roof 
at a construction site. The aesthetic dimension of what he observed included their 
confidence in footwork, posture, manual dexterity, speed in movement, individual 
and shared rhythms, focus of attention, gesticulations as communication, and 
changing positions and postures in order to assist and work with othes. Another 
example concerns how a skilled surgeon uses a scalpel, making precise changes to 
position, pressure, speed of movements in response to cues sensed through vision, 
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touch, ears, and so on. Immediately we get a sense of how aesthetic knowing and 
judgement are enacted, in movement, fused with objects and other people. Indeed 
Strati is explicit in his argument that attending to aesthetic dimensions leads us to 
understand knowledge as interpersonal and enacted, not residing within individu-
als’ heads.  
 
Aesthetic judgments are not just about what we sense, how we sense, what we 
feel, how we move, how we speak, our sense of taste. The idea thus disrupts a reli-
ance on cognition in rationalist or mental models, and thus knowledge, or know-
ing-in-practice are not just about the way we think, but also are formed, sustained 
and enacted through sensory faculties and associated judgements. Schatzki’s ideas 
of practical and general understandings do not fall into the traps of cognitive ra-
tionalism, and have strong embodied qualities. I argue that the elements that Strati 
describes as aesthetic have a comfortable place in Schatzki’s idea of the forms of 
understanding that organise practices. 
 
Strati (2005) connects questions of aesthetics with issues of materiality. The aes-
thetic dimension of an artefact can stimulate our senses and taste. With a practice-
based approach, aesthetic questions pertain to artefacts in their ‘being-in-use’, not 
as static entities. Here I see clear parallels with Schatzki’s idea that we treat mate-
riality in terms of its pertinence to or involvement in practices, and his notion of 
practical intelligibility. For example, the chair placed in the corridor in the middle 
of the night enacted aesthetically as a means to de-pathologise children’s night 
waking and the time taken to resettle them: the pedagogical effect of the chair has 
a profoundly aesthetic and material basis.  
 
An aesthetic sensibility in our research means that we may approach questions of 
practices and learning as (inter)corporeal and multi-sensorial (Strati 2007). This 
resists the privileging of sight as we also consider postures, movements, sounds, 
touch, smells – all highlighted in Parts II and III of this book. This requires forms 
of evocative and metaphorical expression that counter scientific reductionism and 
formalisation. I seek to address this in the chapters that follow through the presen-
tation of vignettes, accounts based on my observations, and through visual repre-
sentations, particularly line drawings based on photographs. These deliberately de-
pict certain features of bodies and materiality, evoking aesthetic senses of poise, 
posture, calm, and so on.  
 
Strati (2008) notes a legitimacy that is now given to the study of aesthetic dimen-
sions of organisational life and practices. Corradi et al (2010) outline how prac-
tice-based approaches have stressed that learning and knowing have aesthetic and 
not just cognitive dimensions. Crucially aesthetic attention requires researchers to 
attend to bodies, in particular material bodies. More recently, Gherardi and Strati 
(2012) articulate the value of a practice-based lens precisely in terms of the em-
phasis it places on aesthetic as well as cognitive dimensions, wherein these imply 
collective (in the sense not individually isolated) forms of sensory awareness, 
qualitative judgement, bodily doings and sayings, and material artefacts, involved 
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together in establishing and maintaining aesthetic order as an inherent part of so-
cial practices.  
 
A sensibility to aesthetics pervades much of what follows in this book, including 
the basis for discerning and changing rhythms (Chapter 5), production of spaces of 
pedagogy through finely attuned body geometries, postures, and gestures (Chap-
ters 6 and 7), and materialisations of aesthetic readings of children’s behaviour 
(Chapter 8). Furthermore, Part III weaves these threads into accounts more sharply 
focused on professional learning.  
 
 
Four essential dimensions of professional practice and learning 
In this section, I will draw out threads from the previous discussion of socio-
material, practice-theoretical and practice-based approaches in order to rehearse 
some of the key arguments that are developed in full in Parts II. This begins with a 
mapping out of the four essential dimensions that form the focus of Chapters 5 to 
8 respectively, and which expand on a Gherardian notion of texture, or connected-
ness in action. Empirical substantiation and illustration of these is put on hold for 
now: the purpose here is to locate the ideas within the broader theoretical terrain 
that I have explored above, and to foreground some of the important ideas from 
other, related, literatures that are brought to bear in the detailed analyses that fol-
low. In the following section I anticipate the theoretical foundations for and argu-
ments developed through Part III by making explicit my stance on the relationship 
between practice and learning, and by introducing the basic Vygotskian concepts 
built upon in Chapter 10. 
 
Part II of this book explores times, spaces, bodies and things as four essential di-
mensions of professional practice and learning. The builds on and significantly ex-
pands my initial working through of this idea (Hopwood 2014a). Gherardi’s 
(2006) notion of texture provides a key conceptual anchor here: the four dimen-
sions all relate to connectedness in action, and professional learning in practice is 
understood in terms of the development, maintenance, modification, restoration 
and repair of textures (see below, and Part III). Each dimension is resourced by a 
range of theoretical and empirical work, including that of Schatzki, but also draw-
ing on critical cultural geographies (Massey 2005; Thrift 2004, 2006, 2007), femi-
nist approaches to embodiment (Grosz 1994; Haraway 1991), and so on. The fol-
lowing sections take each dimension in turn, mapping this rich theoretical 
resourcing. I follow Jackson and Mazzei (2013) and Nicolini 2009b) in arguing 
that such an approach – combining eclecticism with informed selectivity – adds 
significant value to the analysis. 
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I must clarify what I mean when I say the four dimensions are essential. This has 
two aspects. The first is that they constitute practice texture: they are its essence. 
Connectedness in action is constituted in times, spaces, bodies, and things – all 
multiple, enacted, fluid, relational accomplishments, as consisted with a site ontol-
ogy (Schatzki 2003). Schatzki writes that timespace is a “central constitutive fea-
ture of human activity, where by ‘constitutive’ I mean helping to make up what 
something, in this case activity, essentially is” (2010c, p ix). I am adding bodies 
and things to this notion of essential constitution. The second is that they are non-
optional. I argue that there are no textures of practices outside of times, spaces, 
bodies and things. Connectedness in these four dimensions is essential. Put differ-
ently, the dimensions are essential in the sense that if one was taken away, the 
practices to which they relate would collapse. This is a bold claim, but it is one 
that flows out of much writing on sociomateriality (as I will show below).  
 
The obvious question is, why only four dimensions? There may well be others, as 
I acknowledged previously (Hopwood 2014c). A prime contender for a fifth di-
mension might be affect. My sense of the rich emerging literature on affective 
economies (see for example Ahmed 2004) and the ways in which sociomaterialists 
are taking up questions of affect in relation to knowing and materiality (see Ed-
wards & Daniels 2012; Knorr Cetina 1997, 1999, 2001; Knorr Cetina & Brueggar 
2002; Jensen 2012; Miettinen & Virkkunen 2005), leads me to conclude there is 
much to say here – more than I could do justice to in this book without it becom-
ing overwhelming. Its absence from my framework here and subsequent analysis 
is not so much a considered, empirically supported rejection, as a question of 
economy and scope. I had to draw boundaries around the focus of this book some-
where. 
 
Before delving into each of the four dimensions, I must comment briefly on their 
separation. As discussed in Chapter 1, exploring each of the dimensions separately 
(as I do in Part II, and in the conceptual introductions below), is both powerful and 
awkward at the same time. The power lies in the way in which each constitutes a 
distinctive and richly resourced analytical point of departure. By holding, for ex-
ample, times relatively still and central in our gaze, we can notice things about 
professional practices that might otherwise be overlooked. When we switch to fo-
cus on spaces, it is not that times (and other dimensions) are evacuated, but again 
we are cued to, become sensitive to, other features. The awkwardness stems from 
very clear theoretical foundations that challenge the very notion of such separa-
tion: times are not aspatial, bodies are also things, and so on. Goodwin’s (2007) 
account of practices and knowledge in anaesthetic work illustrates this clearly. 
Having discussed these slippages in more detail in Chapter 1, and because I 
acknowledge them throughout Part II, I will say little more here, other than to re-
inforce the point that the outline I provide below is one of analytical distillation or 
perhaps diffraction, to borrow Barad’s vocabulary: a way of exploring entangle-
ments that is at the same time false in its tidiness.  
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As a segue to the discussion of each dimension below, I will quote Nicolini. He 
points to times, spaces, bodies, and things (as well as affect and other issues), and 
highlights how paying attention to them underpins the broader intervention and 
critique constituted in sociomaterial perspectives and practice turns. The quotation 
also highlights how the four dimensions that I discuss are not additions to existing 
thought from outside, but rather come from within. This is a point that the follow-
ing sections will further elucidate. 
The view offered here instead locates knowing both in the doings and sayings and in the 
body, artefacts, habits, and preoccupations that populate the life of organizational 
members. In this way, the idea of practice as the site of knowing offers a vastly richer 
picture of both knowing and organising. It is one in which materiality, spaces, time, the 
body, affectivity, interests, and preoccupations are given prominence and explanatory 
power. It draws attention to a variety of aspects that are usually bracketed or not taken 
into consideration by the sense-making and distributed cognition traditions, starting from 
the fact that the hard work of interlocking behaviours is often delegated to such mundane 
objects as a well-designed piece of paper, as in the example above. In other words, 
claiming that practice constitutes the site of knowing contributes to understanding 
cognition as being not only among people but also, in effect, down to earth. (Nicolini 
2011, p 617) 
Times 
Times as a dimension of practice texture has a number of crucial meanings, many 
of which carry through each of the other dimensions. I see times as plural and en-
acted, not singular, given, entities. Rather than seeing time as something that prac-
tices take or use up, I follow others in understanding times as produced through 
practices. In this sense times must be, by definition, also spatial, embodied and 
material. I will begin by outlining the aspects of Schatzki’s practice theoretical 
view of times as they are pertinent to this book – linking the previous broader dis-
cussion with the detailed empirical analysis that follows in Part II. 
 
While Schatzki, like others (myself included), rejects a fundamental separation be-
tween ontologies and concepts of time and space, he does entertain the value in 
approaching them separately. The notion of activities and practices as temporal-
spatial emerges strongly in Schatzki’s later work, which shifts from a Wittgen-
steinian basis to one more closely informed by Heidegger (Schatzki 2007b, 2009, 
2010c, 2012b, 2012c, 2013). Schatzki holds that times have a bearing on practices, 
and practices produce times. 
 
Schatzki suggests temporality is not marked by succession – what follows what on 
a linear trajectory marked by relentless forward motion of clock time. Instead he 
suggests temporality is always a question of past, present and future, drawing on 
Bergson’s idea that these occur ‘at a single stroke’. Temporality and teleology are 
entwined: each action is performed from the past, now, towards the future. In 
every doing and saying we are already in the world: ‘so long as a person acts, she 
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is sensitive and responsive to states of the world and pursues possibilities’ (1996b, 
p 171). We also always act ahead of ourselves towards something8. ‘The temporal-
ity of activity is thus acting amid entities toward an end from what motivates’ 
(2010c, p 29). 
 
Activity time is one of several terms Schatzki uses to move away from the notion 
of objective time (2006b, 2007b; see also Tretter 2008). Objective time is linear, 
singular, inevitable and used up. Activity time is wound up in the unfolding of ac-
tivity events which exhibit temporal features such as rhythm and patterning 
through their coordination (Schatzki 2006a). Elsewhere (2006b) this is also re-
ferred to as the time of ongoing human activity, human time, and related to what 
other thinkers have called lived time, in contrast to world or physical time (see 
also Schatzki 2009). In Chapter 5 I explore how practices on the Unit enact time 
as if it is it objective, but then move on to examine textures that reflect more fluid 
and multiple notions of activity time. 
 
As a dimension of practices, the notion of times thus pulls strongly towards no-
tions of enactment. The work of Shove (2009) and others (Shove et al 2009a,b) 
highlights the way in which contemporary approaches, focusing on practices and 
materiality, embrace temporality. Rather than practices being linked within a sin-
gle objective time, practices produce multiple times that co-exist. Gherardi 
(2009a, 2012; see also Gherardi & Strati 1998) argues that temporality emerges 
through activities performed and the objects woven into these performances. We 
can, she suggests, go ‘inside’ practices to understand the various orders that are 
produced through them. Times come from within, rather than existing without. 
Barad (2007) rejects a string-like notion of time, but rather talks of entanglement 
(particularly with regard to temporalities of causality). Again multiplicity and en-
actment are foregrounded in place of singular, linear, and container metaphors. 
 
My working with times as an essential dimension draws heavily on Lefebvre’s 
(2004) rhythmanalysis. Schatzki (2010c) offers a substantial account of the prom-
ise of rhythmanalysis in direct relation to his work. Thus I take up rhythmanalysis 
as a complementary analytical toolkit, offering a range of concepts and forms of 
empirical sensibility that enrich exploration of the temporal dimension of profes-
sional practices and learning (see also Hopwood 2014b). Lefebvre suggests rhyth-
manalysis helps us attend to the ‘concrete universal that philosophical systems 
have lacked, that political organisations have forgotten, but which is lived, tested, 
touched in the sensible and the corporeal’ (2004, p 45). Through associated con-
cepts, questions of times become nuanced in reference to notions of similarity and 
difference, secret and public, the body, dressage, aesthetic qualities of perfor-
mances, and materiality. 
 
                                                          
8 Key concepts include Schatzki’s take-up of Heidegger’s thrownness and projection; however 
these are not so crucial in my subsequent analysis, so I gloss over them here. 
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Thus taking times as a point of departure does not betray the fundamental rejec-
tion of exclusive separation between the four dimensions. Indeed, through times, 
we are able to explore spaces, bodies, and things in distinctive and informative 
ways. These key ideas are revisited in Chapter 5, when specific concepts are en-
tangled with empirical data, and with questions of space. 
Spaces 
The meaning of spaces as an essential dimension mirrors many of the key points 
developed in relation to times. Rather than seeing space as a singular, fixed con-
tained for practices, I follow others in understanding spaces as plural, fluid, and 
enacted. Schatzki (1996b) writes of practices ‘opening up’ a type of space. The 
idea of spaces as produced through practices or activity is by no means a new one, 
particularly within critical cultural geography (see Lefebvre 1991; Soja 1996). In-
deed commentators have written of a ‘spatial turn’, a widespread shifting of atten-
tion to space as a corrective to dominant tendencies to foreground history and so-
ciality (see Thrift 2006). Familiar as the notion may be, it remains hugely 
powerful, and is central to both the ontological commitments of sociomaterialism, 
and the distinctive value that contemporary practice approaches to researching 
professional work and learning offer. Fuller and Unwin (2011) are keen to unlock 
the secret spaces of work, suggesting sophisticated tools are required to do this. 
 
While the notion of space(s) as produced is established, sociomaterial approaches 
have expanded our understanding of how this happens and why it is important for 
questions relating to professional practice and learning. Space can be understood 
as an effect of heterogeneous material relations (Fenwick et al 2011). This fore-
grounds materiality in conceptions of space, but in an active, plural and fluid way, 
rather than as a ‘dead’ kind of container. Approached from a non-representational 
perspective, the concept of space takes on exciting new meanings. As Thrift 
(2004, 2006) writes, we can turn away from space as a search for authenticity, as 
separate from movement, and from time (see below). All spaces are understood as 
‘shot through’ with other spaces, replacing clean, exclusive boundaries with po-
rous and fluid edges. All spaces are understood to be in constant motion, always 
open, and multiple in nature. The mobility and multiplicity of space is prominent 
in Massey’s (2005) notion of space as a coming together of trajectories (an idea I 
take up in Chapter 6). 
 
Schatzki’s practice theory adopts a particular view of space that is consistent with 
the position I’ve outlined above. A brief consideration of this is helpful in framing 
some of the links between spaces, practices, and the other dimensions of times, 
bodies, and things. Schatzki’s most detailed discussions of space come later in his 
work, when Heidegger is a stronger influence. Here space is understood in terms 
of its involvement in or pertinence to practice, its being at hand in some unfolding 
activity (2010c). Distance is not conceived in Euclidian terms across two points in 
38  
space. Instead, something is near to the extent that it is woven into ongoing activ-
ity in some way (see above for a discussion of the forms such relationships may 
take). This is important, for example, when one considers how the playroom can 
be produced as many different kinds of spaces: a space of play, a space of relaxa-
tion, and so on. In practices of play, certain materialities of the playroom are 
‘near’, while in practices of relaxation, they are (practically) far, and others move 
closer (see Chapter 6). In Schatzki space is not objective, but tied fundamentally 
to practice. As practices as spaces of multiplicity, so multiple spaces are produced 
or opened up through practices. These may be in the same physical location, and 
may simultaneously. 
 
This brings us to questions of relationships between times and spaces. ‘Spatiality 
reflects temporality but spatiality also determines temporality’ (Schatzki 2010c, p 
171). Here, Schatzki means that the practical nearness of something, its folding 
into ongoing activity, cannot be separated from the ends towards which that activ-
ity is oriented – hence from its activity time(s). In Schatzki, therefore, space and 
time are unified through teleology (more vestiges of his residual humanism are ap-
parent here, see above).  
 
In Schatzki, spaces and times are not conceived separately, although as we have 
seen, we can approach them somewhat distinctively as concepts. Both are viewed 
as inherent constitutive dimensions of reality, not containers for it. The list of 
scholars who have similarly rejected the notions of space as what remains when 
time is frozen and time as extending aspatially (see Lefebvre 1991; Massey 2005; 
Soja 1996 – examples that are woven into this book). Expressing this idea in close 
relation to the notion of enactment, Cooren et al (2005) write of spacing and tim-
ing as hybrid achievements: spaces and times are done, together. 
 
Schatzki does identify a lacuna in Heidegger's philosophy as a basis for his own 
work on time and space, namely a lack of clarity around the human body and how 
it is tied up with questions of time and space (2010c). Hence, in Chapter 6, I return 
to Lefebvre’s (2004) work and draw on rhythmic concepts of secret and public, as 
through rhythmanalysis we not only find rich connections with notions of times, 
but also those of bodies. Again, we find that by foreground ideas of spaces, we are 
led to important ideas that are not necessarily so readily apparent in consideration 
of spaces. Chapter 6 revisits the key ideas outlined above, and entangles them with 
the practices, bodies, materialities, and times of the Residential Unit. 
Bodies 
And so we come to bodies. First, let us address the issue of multiplicity, which ap-
plies here just as it does with times and spaces, and for the same fundamental rea-
sons. Mol (2002) expresses the idea of the ‘body multiple’ in her delicate (actor-
network theory informed) analysis of practices concerned atherosclerosis. I join 
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many sociomaterialists in understanding the body as enacted into being, rather 
than a given biological entity9. As Mol and Law (2004) put it: we do our bodies. 
Thus when I explore bodies in relation to professional practice and learning, my 
interest is not in describing bodily features, but rather bodily performances – on 
how professionals do their bodies. Chapter 7 is chiefly occupied with highlighting 
the body work involved in accomplishment of professional practices on the Resi-
dential Unit, and by extension, in the production of embodied connectedness in ac-
tion. 
 
A second point, and one that again pulls out threads from the previous discussion 
of times and spaces, is that viewing bodies as enacted also entails adopting a rela-
tional perspective. If we explore bodily performances, then we must always be 
looking at bodies in relation to other bodies and other things (for bodies are also 
material presences). Thus, Chapter 7 begins by taking up a spatial theme, examin-
ing body geometries as a form of texture. 
 
Schatzki (1993, 1996b; Schatzki & Natter 1996) presents a particular view of the 
body within his broader practice theory. In particular he distinguishes: 
 Being a body – the body that we are, that aligns with our sense of self and be-
ing; this is the body that ‘does’ for us in what feels like an automatic way: we 
don’t try to see when we open our eyes, we don’t think about moving our legs 
when we walk. To be a body is also to experience bodily sensations and feel-
ings. 
 Having a body – the body that we become aware of in moments of struggle, 
discomfort, or breakdown; the fact that one is a body becomes manifest explic-
itly: when we lose our balance, strain to hear, squint our eyes to see in the dark, 
when we ache after hours of cot rocking, and so on. 
 The instrumental body – this is the body that we put to use in the service of 
other doings; the body that moves the pen as we sign a document or write pro-
gress notes, the body that holds objects in finely tuned balance and relation to 
each other when pouring and measuring expressed breast milk. 
 
This framework is, as I see it, another way of viewing bodies as done in multiple 
ways, and traces of each permeate Chapter 7. Related to this is another tri-partite 
view: Green and Hopwood’s (2015 b) notions of body as background, resource 
and metaphor. Broadly, the first two parallel Schatzki’s being and having a body. 
The third is somewhat different, but usefully brings us into connection with other 
features of a sociomaterial approach to understanding professional practice and 
learning, and wider literatures that resource the analysis presented in Chapter 7.  
 
The body as metaphor points to the way that thinking and writing about the body 
frequently relies on imagery, conceptual standing in and differentiation. Most 
                                                          
9 I also join many in a move away from notions of the body as a discursive construction or prod-
uct of discourse. 
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prominently, it refers to Cartesian mind/body dualism, in which the two are 
viewed as separate, the ethereal mind contained ‘within’ the physical body, the 
body acting at the will of the mind. The same metaphor underpins problematic no-
tions of the mind as rational, and the body as emotional, source of affective inter-
ference. Through this mind and body take on metaphorical association with male 
and female. Thus Turner (2007) refers to epistemological and political failures in-
herent in ways of thinking that have Cartesian dualism as their basis. 
The role of bodies in learning and practice is obvious (Barnacle 2009); one cannot 
act in the world as a ‘brain in a vat’. The subjugation of the bodily to the mental or 
verbal is epistemologically fallacious and contradicts our experience of the body 
as a lived reality (Jackson 1983). However  Dale (2001, cited in Haynes 2008) ar-
gues that ‘scientific’ knowledge writes out the body in the deployment of rational-
ity and objectivity. Professional practices have been encoded as mindful and 
bodyless, performed by ‘empty workers’ (Acker 1990), and many accounts of pro-
fessional practice are ‘virtually bodiless’ (Ellingson 2006; see also 2015). 
Shapin’s (2010) account of scientific practices was a response to precisely these 
oversights. Such somatophobia is reflects perceived dangers of the body and its 
threats to rationality through association with the feminine (Grosz 1994; Swan 
2005). The metaphorical codification of the body as purely biological, devoid of 
expertise, haunts us as intellectuals (Boyer 2005) 
 
Placing bodies at the centre of an analysis of professional practices and learning 
thus constitutes radically different basis (Macintyre Latta & Buck 2008), and con-
tributes the form of critique and intervention that underpin and motivate this book 
(see Chapter 1). This agenda has been taken up recently as an explicit focus of an 
edited volume, dedicated to exploring the body in professional practice, learning 
and education (Green & Hopwood 2015a-c). Paying attention to the body so it 
ceases to be an absent presence (Shilling 2003, 2005) in accounts of social life, is 
now a hallmark of a diverse literature across philosophy, humanities, and social 
sciences. Indeed, such is the momentum gained that scholars write of a ‘somatic 
turn’ (Hancock et al 2000; Monaghan 2002a,b, 2003; Pink 2009; Thrift 2006). It 
seems there is a ‘turn’ for everything: practices, space, body10. The point is not 
that sociomaterial and practice perspectives sprawl across others, or somehow 
subsume them. Rather my intention is to highlight how many of the tenets of soci-
omaterialism are resonant with broader shifts in social theory and research. 
 
Hence the notion of body as metaphor points us to profound shifts in the way the 
body is conceived. However a clean break with Cartesianism is not easy (Hodkin-
son 2005). So profoundly embedded in our thinking is a mind/body dualism that 
we cannot simply pretend it does not influence us any more (Grosz 1994). So 
strong are rationalist views that attempts to suggest there might be intuitive, bodily 
                                                          
10 Reference is also made to a ‘relational turn’: “a theoretical orientation where actors and the 
dynamic processes of change and development engendered by their relations are central units of 
analysis” (Boggs & Rantisi 2003, p 109). This has parallels with the emphasis on relations, as-
semblages, and emergence in sociomaterial and practice theoretical perspectives. 
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forms of knowledge, learning and practice are held as undermining Western soci-
ety (Habermas’ response to Dreyfus, cited in Flyvbjerg 2001). Grosz’ (2004) ap-
proach is to live with the ideas of mind and body, but to reframe their relation. She 
uses a metaphor of a Möbius strip11 – holding mind and body in play, yet allowing 
for their folding together without one collapsing onto or being subsumed within 
the other. This key metaphor is taken up in Chapter 7. Grosz wagers that ‘bodies 
have all the explanatory power of minds’ (1994, p vii), aiming to displace the cen-
trality of mind. 
 
Grosz’s (2004) Möbius metaphor brings us to questions of the body and 
knowledge. Having rejected Cartesian notions of mind being the housing for (all) 
knowledge, what, now, of the body? The work of practice scholars, including 
Schatzki and Gherardi, offers us useful but different responses to this question. In 
Schatzki the body is always approached with practice in mind, within a site ontol-
ogy (see above). Practices are upheld by activities that are in themselves per-
formed through bodily doings and sayings. Every doing and saying is shaped by, 
and upholds, forms of organising that are distinctive properties of wider practices. 
As discussed above, these forms of organizing include practical and general un-
derstandings, as well as rules and teleoaffective structures. All of these imply 
knowledge, or knowing. It is a knowing body that does and says in practice. 
 
Gherardi and colleagues similarly refute a dissociation between mind and body. 
The concept of knowing in practice has at its core a sense that performances are 
not, cannot be, divorced from knowing. Yet these performances are always bodily. 
The emphasis placed on aesthetic qualities in performances and in knowing, judg-
ment, and sense-making, further furnish the metaphors through which concepts of 
mind and body can be grappled with in post-Cartesian ways. Indeed I see both 
Schatzki’s and Gherardi et al’s approaches as consistent with a Möbius metaphor: 
neither fully escapes notions of mind and body, but both bring them into play, 
through practice, in ways that invoke a knowing body, and embodied knowledge. 
It is through such a lens that the body work described in Chapter 7 maintains close 
connection to issues and questions of professional expertise and learning, although 
these are brought into sharper focus in Part III. 
 
It remains to add one final layer to the meaning of ‘bodies’ within my four dimen-
sional framework. This concerns the fuzzy boundaries of the body, and lead us to 
the fourth dimension (things). Schatzki (1996a,b) goes into some detail concerning 
the difficulty in defining the ‘edge’ of the body. This is particularly problematic 
                                                          
11 Imagine a ribbon, one side of which represents ‘mind’, the other ‘body’. One could join them 
as a simple loop and keep them apart, even if they share the same fabric. The Möbius goes one 
step further: before joining two ends of the ribbon, one is flipped over. Thus a creature crawling 
along the ribbon will traverse all of both sides and arrive back at the start, without ever crossing a 
boundary between the two. Thus we can conceive mind and body as sharing the same fabric, dis-
tinct and yet impossible to tease apart fully, resisting any position or moment where one applies 
and the other does not. 
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when the body in question is a doing and done body, with all the qualities of mul-
tiplicity and relationality that flow from this. A key metaphor taken up by 
Schatzki, and in Chapter 7, is that of the cyborg (after Haraway 1991). This sug-
gests that the body does not end at the skin, but can incorporate a range of append-
ages, including clothes, spectacles, prostheses, equipment and so on. The nurse 
wearing latex gloves still feels texture and warmth, now through and with the 
gloves. Just as scholarship on body image suggests its extension across ‘abject 
borders’ (Weiss 1999; Weiss & Fern Haber 1999), so the body in practice resists 
clear demarcation as purely human form. Chapter 7 concludes with an expanded 
note on this point, which is taken up further in Chapter 8.  
 
Thus once again we bump up against the problem of separation between the four 
dimensions. Nonetheless as I have shown with respect to times and spaces, and 
will show below in relation to things, foregrounding questions of the body does 
particular, distinctive work. It elucidates features of sociomaterial and practice 
perspectives that might otherwise have remained murky, and it helps to position 
my related analysis within the broader political terrain and critical corrective that 
characterize this book and of the work that inspires and informs it. The fruits that 
such a conceptualization of bodies can bear can only be fully discerned and articu-
lated through its entanglement with empirical data. This is the focus and work of 
Chapter 7, but before that I must complete the foundation work by explaining the 
conceptual basis for treating ‘things’ as a fourth essential dimension of profes-
sional practice and learning. 
Things 
I use ‘things’ as a (somewhat inadequate) term in reference to materiality, includ-
ing organisms, artefacts, objects and bodies (see Schatzki 2005). My approach to 
understanding things follows the same logics as those discussed above in relation 
to the other dimensions. Interest in things is not as entities, but in the relationships 
or assemblages they become part of in the course of professional practices. As an 
essential dimension, I argue that there can be no connectedness in action that is 
not in some way, material. The previous discussion of Schatzki’s practice theory 
covered much of what is relevant here, including: 
 A site ontology: practices and material arrangements bundle together to pro-
duce reality, and in turn become a basic unit of analysis. Materiality is not 
alongside practices, but rather practices and materiality co-constitute each 
other. 
 Residual humanism: my sharing of Schatzki’s reluctance to follow post-human-
ists in adopting a symmetrical view; retention of something distinctive about 
humanness, while remaining in ‘ontological allegiance’ with broader socio-
material perspectives. 
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 Practical intelligibility: objects acquire meaning within practices, and these 
meanings are practical meanings; the force that the material world exerts arises 
through relationships between things and practices. 
 Spatiality, temporality, embodiment: All four dimensions continually rub up 
against each other; see previous discussion of spatiality understood as the perti-
nence of materiality to ongoing activity, where such activity is teleological and 
therefore produces ‘activity time’, and is performed by the body. 
 
The points above all permeate the detailed analysis of things presented in Chapter 
8. This chapter began with an even broader consideration of materiality within so-
ciomaterial approaches. Recall the quotation from Barad (2007) about how and 
why matter matters. Orlikowski notes: 
Materiality has been largely ignored by organisational theory, which appears to assume 
(often implicitly) that it does not matter or does not matter very much in everyday 
organising. (2007, p 1436)  
Thus the fourth of the essential dimensions explored in Part II brings us back to 
the very heart of sociomaterialism, and the sense that new approaches are needed 
if we are to acknowledge materiality in its full mattering, including in relation to 
phenomena that have often been seen as outside the material realm (such as know-
ing, learning). 
 
As Gherardi’s (2006, 2009b) concept of knowing in practice connects notions of 
mind and body, so her writing equally foregrounds materiality: 
The ideas of movement and materiality focus attention on the fact that meanings arise and 
travel in a spatio-temporal continuum. Too often has the materiality of the social been 
virtually removed by locating thoughts, ideas, politics, the law and culture in an ethereal 
domain or in one which only exists in the world of ideas and in the heads of people. 
Social and work practices have material consistency. (2006 p 91) 
Here, Gherardi is linking things with meaning. This is not in a representational 
sense – things capture or reify meanings that were first in someone’s head, and 
which in turn reflect a truth about the world grasped from an independent view-
point. Her sense, as I understand it, shares the notions of entanglement and enact-
ment that are brought to the fore in Barad’s (2007) diffraction and Thrift’s (2006) 
non-representational theory. The link between things and meaning is a fluid one, 
based in movement, shifting relationships. Meaning does not reside in objects, but 
is produced through practical engagement with them (echoes with ideas of practi-
cal intelligibility are loud here).  
 
Not only are things associated in such ways with meanings, but they can also be 
seen as doing work – work of organising and stabilising (as discussed in Chapter 
8). This often also involves epistemic work – work about what is known and how 
(see Jensen et al 2012b). Chapter 9 takes this up as a key feature of professional 
learning in practice on the Residential Unit – the learning that is required in work-
ing with knowledge and knowing characterised by provisionality, partiality, and 
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contingency. Here, we arrive at another key notion that links things with questions 
of knowing.  
 
Knorr Cetina’s concept of ‘epistemic objects’ (see 2001) takes a firmly non-repre-
sentational and entangled view of the relationship between materiality and 
knowledge. An object is not inherently an epistemic object or not – this quality is 
one that is enacted, dependent on the practices with which it is bundled (in this 
way it might be regarded as a particular form of practical intelligibility). Knorr 
Cetina (2001) tells us that epistemic objects insert moments of interruption and 
conscious reflection, they help dissociate the self from practice. They are open-
ended, incomplete or unfinished, inviting or generating questions. Many materiali-
ties of the Unit can be understood in these terms, including the bodies of infants 
and parents, that professionals attune to, and thus make sense of in ways that treat 
them not like a book to be read, but as an object that raises questions, points to 
what is not known as much as what is known. Clients in residence sheets, personal 
notes, behaviour charts (see Figure 5.1), and other objects routinely folded into 
handover practices are routinely enacted as epistemic objects (see Chapters 8 and 
9; Hopwood forthcoming). Having outlined relevant features of the contemporary 
workplace learning terrain, the next section will address the questions that arise 
within this concerning the relationship between practice and learning. 
An asymmetrical, entangled view of practice and learning 
In this last main section I will outline the position I take in this book in specific re-
gards to the idea of learning within a practice perspective. I begin by locating my 
view alongside others who maintain the need for analytical separability between 
practices and learning. I then present the distinctive arguments that I develop in 
Part III, explaining how they are located within a broader sociomaterial, practice 
perspective, but also take a particular position within contemporary literature. To 
conclude I introduce basic Vyogtskian concepts of scaffolding and the zone of 
proximal development. These are used in Chapter 10 as a basis for conceptualising 
the pedagogic work of supporting parents. This is crucial to the framing of part-
nership-based practices as involving reciprocal learning between professionals and 
service users (in this case, families).  
 
As Hager (2012) demonstrates, the question of the relationship between practice 
and learning is an open and contested one. In the workplace learning literature, 
one can find accounts that maintain a relatively loose connection between learning 
and practice – as temporally separable. In what Hager calls more exclusive ac-
counts of practice, the two are more closely entwined. The questions then are: 
How closely? Does it make sense to separate them analytically? 
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My position is broadly consistent with Hager’s (2012) view. He suggests that on-
going learning is an essential part of good practice. He repeats Taylor’s (1995) ar-
gument that to perform a (professional) practice is not simply a question of rigid 
rule following. The enactment of rules requires judgement, and all practices in-
volve continual interpretation and reinterpretation. Given that are actions are tem-
porally irreversible, this infuses practices with ‘suspense and uncertainty’ (Taylor 
1995 p 177, cited in Hager 2012REF, p 28). This inflects ideas discussed previ-
ously, such as Schatzki’s notion of rules as structuring practices and how they 
hang together: rules are static and external, but rather are folded up in decisions 
about how to act, what to do and say. These are full of suspense and uncertainty.  
Practices unfold in an unstable equilibrium, where small changes require learning 
responses of the practitioner. 
 
I see in Hager (2012) a reluctance to collapse learning and practice onto one an-
other as concepts. He is not sure that it makes sense to regard learning as a prac-
tice itself. This does not mean that we cannot say learning is accomplished 
through practices, or an effect of them. Indeed that is precisely the position I take 
in this book. I cannot imagine learning being accomplished outside of practices – 
without there being some performance of bodily doings and sayings. Such a posi-
tion also allows us to maintain the argument that to practise well is to learn. Over-
all, we cannot conceive of professional practices unfolding without learning also 
being accomplished. 
 
To say that learning is an essential or necessary part of (good) professional prac-
tices, is not to say that one can be reduced to the other, or that both are universally 
co-occurring.  I do not hold the view that in every moment of practice there must 
always be learning. I do not see learning as a continuous, ever-present feature of 
professional practices. To me, this relationship is one of varying degree, and there-
fore one that requires empirical reference, rather than theoretical absolutes. A so-
ciomaterial approach does not mean questions specifically about learning become 
redundant because we just need to look at practices instead. What is needed, and 
what I am offering in this book, is an approach that subjects the idea of learning to 
the same disruptions and assumptions (non-individualistic, material and embodied 
as well as cognitive etc.) without leading to its being replaced or usurped by other 
ideas. To me, questions of learning remain important, and they cannot be an-
swered by only looking at practices, or at knowing.  
I do not adopt notions of knowing and practicing as equivalent or synonymous 
(see Bruni et al 2007). While they may be co-implicated in the idea of any compe-
tent performance in professional practice, the possibility of analytical separation 
proves powerful in empirical analysis (see above). I treat learning and practice in a 
similar way. In the next section I will outline my particular position in more pre-
cise detail. 
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Practice and learning as entangled in asymmetrical and non-
reversible, emergent relations 
My position on the relationship between professional practice and learning can be 
summarised in the points below. My sense is one of entanglement rather than 
equivalence, sameness, or apartness. These key arguments provide a foundation 
for the detailed empirical analysis presented in Part III. 
 
1. Practice and connectedness in action have four essential dimensions: 
times, spaces, bodies, and things. 
2. Professional learning is entangled with but analytically separable from 
practice. 
3. Professional learning involves changes in connectedness in action (tex-
ture) that further the ends of practices though meaningful changes in the 
way practitioners interpret and act in practice. 
4. These changes include producing new textures, repairing, modifying or 
restoring existing ones, or maintaining them in light of other changes. 
This is based on the idea of stability and change as co-present features of 
practices. 
5. Professional learning in practice performs both connecting and sensitis-
ing functions through textural and epistemic work. Attuning is central to 
both of these. 
6. Professional practices that accomplish and unfold through partnership 
with service users have an intensified pedagogic dimension. This has im-
plications for the nature and focus of professional learning: it creates par-
ticular imperatives to learn and foci for the use and emergence of profes-
sional expertise. 
 
These arguments are based on an a priori position concerning the relationship be-
tween practices and learning: professional learning arises through practices, not all 
practices bring about learning. I refer to this as an asymmetrical or non-reversible 
relationship between learning and practice. 
 
At this stage I am simply rehearsing arguments that are developed and justified 
more fully in Part III. Their value and coherence are not absolute and are best 
judged in their entanglement with empirical data. The purpose of such a stance is 
to enhance the outcomes of such entanglement. Does this way of thinking help me 
address the broad questions and themes outlined in Chapter 1? Does it offer new 
and valuable insights into how we understand professional work that proceeds 
amid rubrics of partnership and coproduction? Is it illuminative of things that 
might have been missed otherwise? Does it extend and enrich the critical purpose 
of sociomaterial and related (practice, diffractive, non-representational) ap-
proaches, to intervene and disrupt disembodied, cognitivist and rationalist ac-
counts of professional practice and learning? 
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Learning is a crucial feature of all professional practices as they go on. Hager 
(2011) argues that it is never possible to specify all the knowledge needed in order 
to perform a particular professional practice. Whenever we examine a perfor-
mance or set of performances we can say there is an attendant knowing. 
Knowledge shapes these performances, connects them12, and is enacted through 
them: the knowing and the doing are entwined. 
 
New forms of knowing emerge through practice. Practices create and demand new 
knowledge, new ways of making meaning, responding to the suspense and uncer-
tainty discussed above. This is not to say that all forms of knowledge must be in 
constant flux. But it is to take up the idea of emergence (see above) and suggest 
that practices cannot go ahead if all these elements remain fixed. Practices cannot 
go on without there also being learning. Learning is crucial in order for profes-
sional practices to occur, be maintained over time, preserved in the face of chang-
ing circumstances, and of course to evolve. Billett and Smith write:  
Learning in the circumstances of work is the relational enactment of numerous 
interdependent elements of practice, the process and product of which is the continuing 
transformation of that practice (2014, p 755) 
I similarly view learning in professional practice as a relational accomplishment, 
something that is enacted or done, rather than held or acquired. I therefore view 
professional learning as occurring through changing practices, while also having 
the affect of changing practices. I share Billett and Smith’s (2014) sense of the 
purpose or intentionality in such enactments and transformations. I might also 
clarify here, that the learning I have in mind is different from that described by 
Billett (2014) as mimetic learning. The latter is a very useful conceptual device, 
drawing from anthropology, for understanding how less experienced practitioners 
are able to exploit the learning opportunities that arise through everyday work ex-
periences, based on observation, imitation and practice. This strikes me as rela-
tively conservative in comparison to the notion described by Billett and Smith 
(2014). I this book I am referring to the learning that is required no matter how ex-
perienced the practitioner, and learning that is transformative in the sense that it is 
about how practices respond to changing circumstances. 
 
This is not to say that wherever there is a practice there is always learning. While 
every action may be an instance of knowing, to me this does not imply learning. I 
agree with Edwards (2005a) on the need for a concept of learning that can distin-
guish between what is learned and what is done. Others view learning as ubiqui-
tous, attendant in all engagements in all practices (eg. Billett et al 2005; Manidis 
& Scheeres 2012). Indeed, in his foreword to Hager et al’s (2012c) volume, 
Schatzki (2012a) suggests learning transpires continually as practices are enacted. 
While I agree that practices, learning, and change should be viewed in a ‘tight em-
brace’ (Schatzki 2012a) I do not treat learning as a continuous, incessant feature of 
                                                          
12 For example in forms of practical and general understandings, through which, Schatzki sug-
gests, practices hang together. 
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practices. I see learning as something related to but analytically separable from 
practices. Learning occurs in and through practices. This means that learning be-
comes empirically available through the study of practices (see Chapter 4), rather 
than through methodologies that (attempt to) delve into people’s heads. This posi-
tion can be traced back to the fundamental assumptions of the site ontology 
(Schatzki 2003, see above), which holds that all social phenomena are constituted 
in practices, bundled with sites.  
 
When I say this relationship as asymmetrical I mean that a description of the pro-
fessional practices of the Residential Unit, and a description of learning accom-
plished through those professional practices would not be identical. They would 
be qualitatively different, asymmetrical, although much of their substance would 
be shared. This enables me to distinguish between a practice, say, of a nurse walk-
ing quietly down a corridor in order to reach the lounge, and a practice in which 
the nurse walks quietly down the corridor, attuning closely to the sounds from a 
particular nursery, re-interpreting the word and modifying her actions and the con-
nectedness in action between her, her colleagues, clients, and the behaviour charts, 
post-it notes, clients in residence sheets, progress notes, and so on. To me, it 
makes no sense to treat both as equally of interest to us in terms of learning. But it 
does make absolute sense to pursue an interest in learning through the study of 
practices. Hence the companion metaphor of non-reversibility. Discriminating be-
tween practices, actions (which are all knowing in their performance) and learning 
brings about a number of benefits that will be evident in the arguments I present in 
Part III. Having address the first two points listed above, I will now turn to the 
third and fourth. 
 
I conceive professional learning as changes in ways of knowing that occur in and 
further the ends of practices. What changes in professional knowing are implied 
here? Edwards (2005a) refers to learning as changes in the way people interpret or 
act in the world. This distinguishes learning from giving and receiving of infor-
mation (and in doing so rejects possession and acquisition metaphors). She views 
(professional) learning as  
A question of repositioning oneself in relation to aspects of knowledge through changing 
one’s interpretations of contexts and the possibilities for action within them. (Edwards 
2000, p 200). 
Edwards’ ideas are rooted in Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT), which 
foregrounds both the social and materially mediated nature of learning13. She high-
lights how CHAT continues Vygotsky’s rejection of Cartesian dualism, and its 
‘embodied and culturally embedded’ view of mind (Edwards 2000, p 199). Ed-
wards’ (2012) discussion of CHAT approaches to links between knowledge, prac-
tice and intentionality (motive) is further revealing of resonances with many of the 
                                                          
13 See Nicolini (2012) for an excellent account of CHAT within a broader practice theory ap-
proach to studies of work and organisation, and the role of Marxist philosophy in the twentieth 
century return to practice. 
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ideas and assumptions discussed in this chapter14. Edwards and Daniels explicitly 
take a ‘practice view of knowledge’ (2012, p 43), and make close links between 
CHAT and Knorr Cetina’s work on epistemic cultures and objects (see also 
Hopwood forthcoming). Mäkitalo’s (2012) paper the mateirality of social prac-
tices in professional learning, from a sociocultural, Vygotskian perspective, sits 
comfortably alongside other sociomaterial contributions to the special issue ‘Re-
conceptualising Professional Learning’. Thus I view it as a consistent enough with 
a sociomaterial and practice theoretical approach: in my analysis performative, 
aesthetic, spatial, temporal and embodied features are given greater emphasis.  
 
Thus I refer to changes in knowing as professional learning insofar as they arise 
from and produce changes in the way people interpret and act in the world. I do 
not pull interpretations and actions apart from each other, but view them as co-
constituents of knowing performances. This is consistent with the notion of practi-
cal intelligibility, where the meaning of materiality is folded up with ongoing ac-
tivity. It also makes coherent connections with Gherardi’s notion of knowing in 
practice.  
 
What kind of difference must be made for a change in knowing to qualify as learn-
ing? My answer to this lies in the fourth point above. This difference refers to pro-
ducing new textures (connectedness in action), modifying, restoring or repairing 
them, or maintaining them in the face of other change. Thus I specify the concept 
of professional learning with reference to the idea of connectedness in action. As 
discussed previously, I argue that such connectedness has four essential dimen-
sions. In this way, the exploration of textures in terms of times, spaces, bodies, 
and things in Part II becomes a crucial basis for the account of learning presented 
in Part III.  
 
Billett and Smith’s (2014) discuss transformations and learning in practice. They 
describe how handover activities between nurses not only transact practice but 
also transform it. They suggest these transformations may be subtle, almost indis-
tinguishable, as when previous practices are re-enacted. Or they may be more pro-
nounced as when explicit decisions are made to change the course of action. My 
approach shares their view that transformations vary qualitatively, but seeks to 
draw an analytical line through the very broad range denoted by Billett and Smith, 
to sharpen the sense of change and difference that is made to practice through 
learning.  
 
                                                          
14 In particular, Edwards (2012) notes the idea that motives are neither internal nor only in prac-
tices, but arise in people’s engagements in practices – to me this is echoed in Schatzki’s notions 
of teleoaffective structures  and the relationships between practices and activity; secondly Ed-
wards notes Leont’ev’s view, building on Marx, that practice and cognition mutually arise 
through and constrain each other.  
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It is important to clarify that notions of repair, modification, and restoration do not 
imply a single, linear trajectory that can be specified in advance. This would un-
dermine the notion of practices as emergent and indeterminate. Such changes to 
textures are not accomplished with reference to an invisible, known trajectory, but 
as in-the-moment responses to the suspense and uncertainty of practice. In the 
case of the Residential Unit, the referent is always a notion of effective partnership 
with families, which implies particular relational qualities, and evidence of posi-
tive change for families. There are (prefigured) patterns and routines that mean 
some textures are more familiar and expected than others. Practices on the Unit do 
indeed display and produce some highly rhythmic qualities (see Chapter 5), and 
there are spatial geometries and patterns (Chapter 6) and choreographed practices 
such as handover (Chapter 9). There are some forms of professional knowing that 
are more stable and widespread than others (see discussion of pedagogic continu-
ity in Chapter 10). These constitute instances where textures may be brought back 
towards arrangements that are routinized, and which shape the collective anticipa-
tion of how things would normally, or should be. However, as Chapter 9 shows, 
professional practices on the Unit proceed amid significant degrees of provisional-
ity, partiality and fragility of knowing. Thus textures are not plotted and monitored 
against a stable, known ‘map’.  
 
Restoration, repair and modification have no fixed referent, but are always tied to 
the emergent, contingent, and suspenseful unfolding of practice. In this way, these 
concepts add to the notions of practice change outlined by Schatzki (2013), plac-
ing learning and shifting textures as key figures in the constant dance between sta-
bility and change. 
 
The view of learning I have presented here and take up in Chapter 9 in not based 
on deviations from or perpetuation of a linear course of action. Instead it is based 
across changing relationships between people and things that arise from, are con-
stituted in, and have an impact on professional practice. Learning in professional 
practice is not only about creating new textures. Understanding practices as com-
plex and emergent leads us to recognise that no matter how well established and 
seemingly stable practices may seem, there is almost always a degree of concur-
rent change: stability and change co-occurring (see Price et al 2012; Schatzki 
2013). In some cases changes will prompt or require the creation of new connec-
tions in action and, qualifying a sensible notion as to the degree of change, we can 
say that learning is occurring. But learning is also required to maintain and perpet-
uate practices. Perturbations to ways of working arise, and these may put strain on 
textures, or even break them.  
 
Notions of modification, restoration and repair point to ways in which practition-
ers keep practices going amid, attuned to, and altering material arrangements. 
Modification implies both stability and change: adjustment but not revolution. 
Restoration is not a movement backward in time, but a steering of emerge towards 
more historically prefigured forms. The metaphor of repair acknowledges that 
there are instances of breakdown in practices. By breakdown I mean when actions 
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do not hang together in the ways they need to in order for practices to go on, for 
them to accomplish the ends around which they are oriented. Practices can stall, or 
seize up, or mistakes can be made. In the context of partnership, repair may be 
needed when connections are severed – for example if a handover is missed or 
notes misplaced, making linking from one shift to another more difficult. Repair 
may also be needed in relationships between professionals and families if trust is 
lost. While there may be a repertoire of repair strategies from which professionals 
may draw, each instance of repair is different. Whenever new textures are created, 
or existing textures are modified, restored and repaired, this is an effect of profes-
sional learning.   
Professional learning, pedagogy and partnership 
In Chapter 2 I introduced the idea of partnership between professionals and fami-
lies as an instance of a broader scene of shifting relationships between profession-
als and service users. I argued that such moves towards coproduction intensify the 
pedagogic nature of professional work. I frame partnership practices as based in 
reciprocal learning between professionals and parents. My focus in this book is 
not on the pedagogic practices of professionals per se, but on the professional 
learning that is woven into such pedagogic work. Professional learning and prac-
tice and the pedagogic practices of working in partnership as I describe them in 
Chapter 10 share, produce, and are shaped by common temporalities, spatialities, 
embodied action and material arrangements. Pedagogy and professional learning 
are entangled. 
 
While the focus remains on professional practices and learning, the pedagogic as-
pect cannot go conceptually unaddressed. To this end I draw on Vygotsky’s con-
cepts of the zone of proximal development and scaffolding. Let me be clear: I 
claim no great sophistication in this application. As I have intimated previously, a 
Vygotksian notion of pedagogy fits well within my broader framing, given its so-
cial and material emphases. The Vygotskian tradition of cultural historical activity 
theory (which has Marxist origins) is named by Fenwick et al (2011) as among 
key contemporary sociomaterial approaches15, and is addressed in detail by Nico-
lini (2012). He positions Marx alongside Heidegger and Wittgenstein as key fig-
ures in the ‘rediscovery of practice’. As I mentioned above, Vygotskian traditions 
share important hallmarks of sociomaterialism, including rejection of Cartesian 
mind/body dualism, and embodied concepts of mind (see Edwards 2000). 
 
I will thus wrap up this chapter with a brief outline of these concepts as I put them 
to work, entangling them in the analysis of Chapter 10. It is worth noting that the 
professional practices that are the focus of this book have not traditionally been 
conceived as pedagogic in nature, although there is a growing body of work 
                                                          
15 See also Fenwick (2006)’s discussion of practice-based conceptualisations of learning. 
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demonstrating the relevance and value of such an approach (Fowler, Dunston, Lee 
et al 2012a; Fowler, Rossiter, Bigsby et al 2012; Fowler & Lee 2007; Hopwood 
2013, 2014a-c, forthcoming; Hopwood et al 2013; Lee et al 2012). As will become 
apparent as in Chapter 9, unpacking concepts of the ZPD and scaffolding proves 
highly fertile in terms of elucidating learning, emergent forms of knowing in prac-
tice, and the variously skilled and aesthetic accomplishments of everyday profes-
sional work on the Unit. This understanding is achieved by interweaving socio-
material and practice theoretical concepts with the basic pedagogical ideas. In 
other words, it is through entanglement with other ideas that these concepts bear 
fruit.  
 
The zone of proximal development (ZPD) is perhaps one of Vygotsky’s better-
known concepts. The ZPD is defined as ‘the distance between the actual develop-
mental level (ALD) as determined by independent problem solving and the level 
of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guid-
ance or in collaboration with more capable peers’ (Vygotsky 1978, p. 85). Put 
simply, it refers to the difference between what someone can do now, alone, and 
what she or he can do now, with appropriate support and guidance. This means 
that guidance should be oriented towards what lies just beyond current capability: 
What the child can do in cooperation today he can do alone tomorrow. Therefore the only 
good kind of instruction is that which marches ahead of development and leads it; it must 
be aimed not so much at the ripe as at the ripening functions. (Vygotksy 1986, p 188) 
While Vygotksy’s definition referred to children, the concept has been used to un-
derstand learning throughout life. My analysis conceives the professional role as 
providing support and guidance that brings parents into their ZPD. This does not 
infantilise parents, nor does it imply a didactic role on the part of the professional.  
Rather, when parents approach the challenges they face together with parenting 
professionals, the situation is no longer one of independence, but one of collabora-
tion, in which different expertise and experience are now available. 
 
As mentioned previously Edwards (2005a) defines learning as changes in the way 
a person interprets and acts on the world. So, in the context of parenting services, I 
take the ZPD to refer to interpretations and actions that lie just above parents’ cur-
rent capability – those that they can undertake when appropriate support is in 
place (see Hopwood 2013). This support is termed scaffolding (see below). The 
ZPD has an upper limit: there are some interpretations and actions that, given the 
current ALD, are not achievable regardless of the support in place. This does not 
mean parents can never reach that point, but rather than changes within their ZPD 
must be addressed first, as a means to then take on those that currently lie beyond 
this. Vygotksy (1986) noted that presenting a child with problems he [sic] is able 
to handle without help fails to utilize the ZPD. By extension, this means that pro-
fessionals on the Residential Unit must bring parents into a zone of challenge that 
by definition they would not cope with alone. This is entirely consistent with the 
FPM (see Chapter 2; Davis & Day 2010; Day et al 2015), in which partnership is 
not a question of a particular quality of relationship between professionals and 
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parents, but a question of creating the relational basis under which meaningful 
challenge can be presented and taken on. 
 
Scaffolding is the term used widely to refer to the support placed around a learner 
that enables her to enter her ZPD. The collaboration and availability of different 
expertise and experience that come about through working with others on a prob-
lem takes a particular form through scaffolding. The helping or supporting party 
does not take over and solve the problem for the learner. She rather works to put 
in place concepts, tools, various kinds of assistance and guidance, in order to help 
the learner interpret and act in new ways. Thus my working use of the concept of 
scaffolding refers that which enables parents to enter their ZPD. The idea is that 
scaffolding is later withdrawn, at a point when parents can now continue these 
newly developed interpretations and actions independently. The quotation above 
speaks of a being able to do alone tomorrow things that could only be achieved in 
collaboration today. Thus I conceive partnership as working with parents, helping 
them enter their ZPD, and then withdrawing scaffolding such that parents’ inde-
pendent capacity is now enhanced (see Hopwood 2013 for more detail). 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have set this book within a diverse theoretical terrain. I have clari-
fied my ontological position, following a Schatzkian site ontology, and located 
this as a distinctive but allied feature of wider sociomaterialist perspectives, high-
lighting the emphasis on performance and emergence within a non-representa-
tional paradigm. I have explained the key concepts of Schatzki’s practice theory as 
they pertain to the analysis presented in Parts II and III, and I have supplemented 
this with accounts of knowledge, knowing and aesthetics. Rehearsing Part II, I 
have explained the theoretical basis and meaning of times, spaces, bodies and 
things as four essential dimensions of professional practices and learning. And I 
have laid the groundwork for Part III, grappling with the difficult question of the 
relationship between practice and learning, stating my own position and the dis-
tinctive arguments that will be developed, specified and justified in Chapters 9 and 
10. However, before any of these ideas can be entangled with empirical data, I 
must account for the processes through which these data came into being. Hence 
Chapter 4 describes my ethnographic methodology, and inflects this with a site 
ontological view of ethnography as a practice through which the researcher be-
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